From: jimruttshow8596
This article provides an analysis of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, drawing insights from a discussion between Jim Rutt and Samo Burja. The conversation, recorded approximately four weeks into the conflict, offers a perspective on the military situation, Western response, potential for settlement, and broader geopolitical implications. [00:01:19]
State of the Conflict (Four Weeks In)
The common consensus in the West by late March 2022 was that Ukrainians had performed better than expected, and Russians substantially worse. [00:01:51] However, Samo Burja offered a differing view, suggesting a “slow Russian advance” consistent with mechanized warfare, particularly in besieging cities like Mariupol and, eventually, Kyiv. [00:02:26] He noted that the French Defense Ministry’s maps and reports appeared to be less about “cheerleading” and more about objective reporting on the war. [00:02:56] Burja predicted a “tragic scenario” unfolding, where Russians would likely use artillery to level cities, a method pioneered in the Chechen War, to expedite capture. [00:03:15]
Constraints on Russian Tactics
Jim Rutt introduced the concept of “maximum acceptable atrocity,” suggesting that there might be a level of Russian brutality that would provoke direct Western intervention, which Russia would want to avoid given its military’s underperformance against a potential Western air and naval power. [00:04:36] Samo Burja countered that public opinion, even in the face of civilian casualties and “heartbreaking images,” might not directly translate into Western military intervention. [00:06:01] He argued that Western governments, particularly the U.S. State Department and DoD, have “preconceived policies” that public opinion doesn’t easily sway. [00:07:17] Burja suggested that only the use of “novel kinds of weapons” like chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons might be sufficient to trigger such a response. [00:09:10]
Military Stalemate and Future Prospects
The Institute for the Study of War reported that the Russian offensive had “failed” and was reaching “stalemate or culmination,” where friction prevented further significant pushes. [00:10:14] This doesn’t mean the war is over, as historical parallels like World War I and the Eastern Front of World War II show periods of pushes and culminations. [00:10:43] Samo Burja still expected more Russian territorial gains in large chunks of eastern Ukraine within the next 20 days, and the besieging and taking of more cities. [00:12:10] He believed Odessa is unlikely to fall in the short term and Kyiv may not be captured in the next month, but eventually, fighting would reach the capital. [00:12:07] For Russia, a symbolic victory is necessary for domestic politics. [00:12:45] Currently, Burja assesses the situation as a “moderate Ukrainian defeat.” [00:26:55]
Western Response: Network Power
The Western response, encompassing governmental sanctions and non-governmental corporate withdrawals from Russia, has been unprecedented. [00:12:56] Samo Burja characterized this as a new expression of “soft power,” which has evolved into “network power.” [00:13:50] Social media, particularly Twitter, has significantly accelerated the communication and consensus-building among Western organizations and the “white-collar bureaucratic class.” [00:14:14] This rapid alignment led to quicker and sharper condemnation and sanctions than previously expected, such as the swift removal of Russian banks from SWIFT. [00:16:04]
Impact of Western Sanctions on Russia
Serious harm to the Russian economy has already occurred, with the goal of weakening Russia’s future military potential. [00:18:24] While some sanctions are symbolic (e.g., companies ceasing new business but maintaining existing revenue streams), about half of the corporate actions involve significant economic costs to both Russia and the companies themselves (e.g., Boeing and Airbus halting parts and maintenance for Russian airlines). [00:19:46] However, Burja doubted that the sanctions would significantly alter the course of the war itself, given Putin’s political overcommitment to the conflict. [00:19:30]
Possibilities and Challenges of Settling the Conflict
Samo Burja expected Russia to occupy a substantial portion of Ukrainian territory and not retreat. [00:21:45] This could manifest as continued Russian military presence while still acknowledging Ukrainian control, or the establishment of more puppet states. [00:22:02]
An “optimistic scenario” for Ukraine would see it lose some territory, but continue to receive long-term high-tech weapons and economic integration from the West, transforming it into a “fairly secure country” with a well-trained military, even if not a NATO member. [00:22:50]
Burja predicted that a formal peace treaty is unlikely. Instead, the conflict might resolve into a “never-ending ceasefire,” similar to the Donbas situation after 2014. [00:24:00] This is because Ukraine would likely want to preserve its claims to its internationally recognized borders, making a formal recognition of Russian gains a loss of face. [00:24:20] Russia would likely need to pull out of almost all of Ukraine except Crimea for Ukraine to even consider recognizing Crimea as Russian. [00:24:49]
Jim Rutt proposed a hypothetical settlement: Crimea goes to Russia, Donbas provinces remain with Ukraine but receive substantial autonomy, and Ukraine agrees not to join NATO for 15-20 years. [00:27:14]
Potential Game Changers
- Russian Reinvigoration: If Russia could reinvigorate its mobile offensive, e.g., by taking Dnipro, it could cut off Ukrainian forces in Donbas. [00:30:21]
- Ukrainian Counter-attacks: If Ukraine could successfully roll back Russian forces on multiple fronts (e.g., recapturing Kherson), it could dramatically change the dynamic, potentially increasing Zelensky’s demands while making Putin more realistic. [00:31:56] Samo Burja suggested this would be a “new founding myth” for Ukraine, fostering ambition and patriotism, but it could also destabilize the Russian Federation, leading to new secessionist efforts and conflicts in regions like Chechnya. [00:32:48]
- Zelensky’s Capture or Death: While this wouldn’t help Russia domestically, it would shake the Ukrainian government and likely cause Western support to “go limp” as the war effort is so embodied in his persona. [00:34:34]
- Belarusian Intervention: A move by Belarus, with Russian support, to cut off supply lines from Poland along the Ukraine-Polish border could change dynamics. [00:36:22] Burja doubted the Belarusian military’s capacity for such an operation, noting a lack of evidence for institutional reform there, unlike in the Russian military. [00:36:49]
Military Strategies and Warfare
Russian Incompetence in 5th-Gen Warfare
The Russians have appeared surprisingly inept at what might be considered “5th-generation warfare” or network warfare. [00:38:09] They haven’t prioritized destroying critical infrastructure like bridges (allowing foreign leaders to travel by train to Kyiv) or maintaining control over the internet and electricity. [00:38:31] Furthermore, their psychological warfare and media manipulation efforts have been “utterly outplayed” by the Ukrainians in the West. [00:38:51]
Samo Burja suggested that claims of Russian misinformation talent might have been overstated. [00:39:34] He also believed Russia’s initial goal was to keep Ukrainian infrastructure running, intending to use it later, which might have been overly optimistic. [00:39:54]
Offense-Defense Balance
The conflict raises questions about the changing balance between offense and defense in modern warfare. [00:42:50] The effectiveness of inexpensive, smart anti-asset weapons (anti-tank, anti-air) against very expensive assets like tanks, helicopters, and planes suggests that defense might now be tactically dominant in mechanized warfare. [00:42:12]
The Ukrainian forces, despite sharing a common military tradition with Russia, have benefited from extensive Western training in light infantry tactics since 2014. [00:43:55] This strategy, focusing on smart weapons and decentralized operations, has proven effective against Russia’s quantitative advantages. [00:44:14]
Russian Military Underperformance
Possible reasons for Russian underperformance include:
- Institutional problems: Difficulty in coordinating and carrying out mechanized warfare across all levels, indicating that even 90% of institutional reforms might only yield 10-20% effectiveness in complex operations. [00:45:06]
- Debugging period: Armies often start wars as “unmitigated disasters” and improve over time as competent leaders are promoted and reforms are implemented through “large-scale military experience.” [00:46:06]
- High consumption rate: The rapid consumption of high-tech weaponry (e.g., half of Russia’s cruise missile inventory used) means there isn’t “years to improve.” [00:47:12]
- Supply chain issues: Not just for Russia, but European militaries have “extremely limited” stockpiles, meaning a prolonged conflict might revert to simpler warfare, which would favor Russia. [00:47:52]
Broader Implications
Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War
- Big wars still happen: Contrary to assumptions since the 1990s, large wars involving “middle powers” like Russia are still a reality. [00:49:25]
- Break of Taboo: Putin’s invasion has broken the post-1945 taboo against attacking a neighbor to absorb territory, potentially ushering in a return to a historical norm of border revision through military means. [00:50:26]
- Network Economic Deterrence: The aggressive network economic response from the West could potentially serve as a new form of “collective deterrence” against future aggressive warfare, by inflicting severe costs. [00:51:03] However, if territorial gains are still made, other countries might simply view it as a challenge to adapt their economies and learn to fight such wars more effectively. [00:52:12]
China’s Takeaway
China will likely perceive a strong benefit in disentangling from Western economies to gain “political freedom of action.” [00:52:45] To address the Taiwan question, China might embark on a multi-decade policy of building new partnerships with African, Asian, and even Russian countries to secure raw resources and markets, bypassing global Western institutions. [00:53:15] This would allow China to “disentangle” its economy and make it more robust against Western “economic network attack.” [00:54:27] The current conflict might lead China to delay any action on Taiwan for perhaps 20 years, focusing instead on building an independent global trade network. [00:54:39]