From: jimruttshow8596
The RussiaUkraine conflict and military strategy has presented a complex and evolving landscape of military strategies and warfare, drawing analysis from experts on the ground and those observing from afar. Samo Burja, founder of Bismarck Analysis, offered insights into the conflict’s progression and potential future, challenging some conventional Western views [01:19:07].
Current Military Situation
Samo Burja observed a slow but steady Russian military tactics and strategy advance, consistent with what is expected for mechanized warfare and city sieges [02:26:07]. He noted that Russia had captured a significant amount of territory [02:50:47]. He cited the French Defense Ministry’s maps and reports as the most accurate Western source, suggesting they are less prone to “cheerleading” and more focused on objective reporting [02:56:07].
Burja anticipated a “tragic scenario” unfolding, where Russia would “slog through” several Ukrainian cities, including Mariupol and eventually Kyiv, using artillery to level cities, a method pioneered in the Chechen War [03:15:23], [03:36:02], [03:38:09]. He predicted that Kyiv would not be captured in the next month but that fighting would eventually reach the city, as a symbolic victory is crucial for Russia’s domestic politics [02:28:14], [03:33:07].
At four weeks into the war, Burja viewed the situation as a “moderate Ukrainian defeat,” with Russia holding and gaining territory in the south and east [02:53:05], [02:45:00]. He also suggested that within the next 20 days, Russia would make more territorial gains in eastern Ukraine, besieging and taking more cities [03:10:04].
Contrasting Views
Jim Rutt raised the concept of “maximum acceptable atrocity,” suggesting that a certain level of Russian brutality could force Western intervention [04:36:06]. Burja countered that while civilian casualties are a political liability, they do not directly translate into Western military intervention via public opinion unless Western governments are already inclined to intervene [06:00:23], [06:40:02], [06:51:08]. He cited the example of Sarajevo, where extensive destruction did not prevent atrocities in the Balkan wars [09:34:02]. He noted that the use of novel weapons (chemical, biological, nuclear) would be a more significant trigger for intervention [09:10:07].
The Institute for the Study of War reported that the Russian offensive had “failed” and was reaching “stalemate or culmination,” where friction prevents further immediate advance [10:14:02]. Burja agreed that Odessa might not be captured in the short term, but he still expected significant territorial gains by Russia in eastern Ukraine [12:07:07], [12:12:05].
Evolution of Warfare and Strategy
Network Warfare and Sanctions
The Western response, characterized by severe governmental and non-governmental sanctions, was noted as unprecedented [12:54:02], [13:00:03]. Burja described this as a new expression of “soft power,” now functioning as “network power” due to the intense acceleration of communication through social media, particularly Twitter [13:48:06], [14:37:06], [16:00:00]. This rapid consensus among the “white-collar, educated” class, who are heavy Twitter users, led to faster and sharper condemnation and organizational sanctions [16:29:05], [16:47:06], [16:51:08].
While Burja acknowledged that serious economic harm had already occurred to the Russian economy, he believed the primary goal of the sanctions was to weaken Russia’s future military potential rather than immediately stop the current invasion [18:24:06], [18:48:08], [19:07:07]. He noted that many corporate sanctions were symbolic, with only about half having real “teeth” [19:46:00], [20:16:07]. However, some, like Boeing and Airbus cutting off parts and maintenance, were substantial [20:40:09].
Russian Military Underperformance
The perceived underperformance of the Russian military was attributed to difficulties in executing mechanized warfare effectively, suggesting that even if 90% of institutional reforms are correct, the remaining 10% or 20% can severely hamper overall effectiveness [45:47]. This “debugging” process typically occurs during large-scale military experience [46:38]. Jim Rutt highlighted that the high pace of modern kinetic warfare might not allow for the years of improvement seen in historical conflicts like the American Civil War [47:26].
Another factor contributing to Russian underperformance in “fifth-generation warfare” (network phenomena, psychological warfare) was their apparent cluelessness or ineptitude [38:09], [39:22]. While the Russians were thought to be great manipulators, they have been “outplayed” by the Ukrainians in the West [38:57], [39:34]. Their initial objective to keep Ukrainian infrastructure running for later use might explain why they didn’t destroy bridges and power plants more aggressively [39:54].
Offense-Defense Balance
The discussion touched upon the historical shifting balance between offensive and defensive military power. While expensive anti-asset weapons (Javelins, Stingers) could theoretically shift the balance towards defense [42:12], Burja believed it depended on the type of warfare pursued [43:15]. He agreed that for mechanized warfare, defense might be stronger, but this might not apply to air supremacy strategies like those employed by the United States [43:01].
The symmetrical nature of Ukrainian and Russian forces, both stemming from a common military tradition, played a role [43:45]. However, Ukraine’s focused training in light infantry tactics with smart weapons since 2014, led by Western special forces, has been surprisingly effective against Russia’s numerical and tank advantages [43:56].
Paths to Settlement and Future Implications
Ceasefire vs. Peace Treaty
Burja did not expect a formal peace treaty, but rather a “never-ending ceasefire” similar to the Donbas situation from 2014 [24:00:00]. He argued that Ukraine would likely maintain claims to its internationally recognized borders, making a final settlement (e.g., ceding Crimea or Donbas) a loss of face [24:25:00].
Jim Rutt proposed a hypothetical settlement: Crimea to Russia, substantial autonomy for Donbas within Ukraine, and Ukraine agreeing not to join NATO for 15-20 years [27:14:00]. However, neither side currently appears ready to accept such terms [27:41:00].
Potential Game Changers
- Russian Offensive: If Russia reinvigorates its mobile offensive and captures strategic points like Dnipro, it could cut off Ukrainian forces in Donbas, though this would likely be a slow process given current Russian capabilities [30:21:00].
- Ukrainian Counter-attacks: If Ukraine successfully rolls back Russian forces on multiple fronts, it could elevate Ukrainian national ambition and create a new “founding myth” [32:00:00], [32:20:00], [32:48:00]. This would destabilize the Russian Federation, potentially leading to new secessionist efforts and conflicts in regions like the Caucasus [33:42:00], [33:58:00].
- Zelensky’s Fate: The capture or killing of President Zelensky, while potentially boosting his martyrdom status in the West, would likely cause Western support for Ukraine to “go limp” [34:34:00], [35:42:00]. So much of Ukraine’s PR effort is embodied in him that his removal could undermine the perception of the war effort [35:02:00].
- Belarusian Intervention: A thrust by Belarus along the Ukrainian-Polish border to cut off supply lines from Poland could change the dynamics, but Burja questioned the Belarusian military’s capacity to succeed in such an operation [36:23:00], [36:47:00].
Lessons from the RussoUkrainian War
- Big Wars Still Happen: The conflict has demonstrated that large-scale wars involving “middle powers” like Russia are still possible, challenging the assumption that wars would remain small affairs since the 1990s [49:25:00], [49:52:00].
- Deterrence: The network economic response could potentially serve as a collective deterrent against future aggressive warfare, making the costs prohibitive [51:03:00]. However, Burja cautioned that if territorial gains are made, other countries might view this as a challenge to learn how to fight such wars better and design economies to be more resilient to economic network attacks [52:10:00].
- Geopolitical implications of the RussiaUkraine conflict: China’s Takeaway: China will likely perceive a strong benefit in disentangling from Western economies to gain greater political freedom of action [52:45:00]. This could involve building new partnerships directly with African and Asian countries, bypassing global institutions, to secure resources and markets and sustain its industrial base [53:15:00]. This long-term strategy would be driven by the domestic importance of the Taiwan question, even if it seems a disproportionate effort [53:46:00].