From: jimruttshow8596
This article explores the geopolitical ramifications and potential scenarios arising from the Russia-Ukraine conflict, based on analysis from Samo Burja of Bismarck Analysis and Jim Rutt.
Initial Overview and Early Days of the Conflict
As of the recording, Russian forces have entered Ukraine, securing several cities, roads, and routes, though major urban centers like Kyiv remain under Ukrainian government control [00:01:36] [00:01:47] [00:01:49]. The Ukrainian government has surprised many observers by its sustained resistance, indicating that initial expectations for its survivability were low given Russia’s superior military power on paper [00:01:55] [00:02:01] [00:02:04] [00:02:08]. The future of the conflict remains uncertain, with various scenarios possible [00:02:21].
Demographics and Military Readiness
Both Russia and Ukraine face unfavorable demographics, characterized by aging populations and a significant proportion of young people having emigrated for work [00:03:07] [00:03:14] [00:03:17] [00:03:18]. Modern military technology requires extended training periods, making it difficult to quickly field large numbers of trained soldiers for expensive equipment like rocket artillery, modern tanks, and jet fighters [00:03:40] [00:03:45] [00:03:47] [00:03:51] [00:04:00] [00:04:14].
Potential Scenarios for the Conflict’s Resolution
1. Russian Victory
A Russian victory is considered the most likely overall scenario [00:02:30] [00:02:32].
Military Aspects of a Russian Victory
A military victory would involve Russia sustaining tolerable casualties, which are higher than what Western countries might accept due to Russia not being a “western liberal democracy” [00:02:43] [00:02:46] [00:02:48] [00:02:55]. Russia would retain enough hardware and avoid losing too many highly trained troops [00:04:19] [00:04:21]. It is expected that Russia would occupy the eastern half of Ukraine, with the western half either surrendering or becoming a rump state [00:04:26] [00:04:28] [00:04:30]. The eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk, which have pursued secessionist programs, are likely to be integrated into Russia [00:04:42] [00:04:45] [00:04:51] [00:05:05] [00:05:39].
Political and Economic Consequences of a Russian Victory
A victorious Russia would face significant financial and political isolation from the West but would lean heavily on China [00:05:43] [00:05:46] [00:05:48]. Despite sanctions, Russian gas continues to flow to Europe, and Russia has not cut off this supply [00:05:55] [00:05:57] [00:06:06]. Russia is preparing for an era of liquefied natural gas transport via Arctic ports, indicating a long-term shift towards exporting energy to China rather than Europe [00:06:28] [00:06:30] [00:06:37] [00:07:09] [00:07:17] [00:07:32] [00:07:34]. China has the financial resources to support Russia if needed [00:08:06] [00:08:09].
While Russia is a major military power, its economy is relatively small, comparable to Spain’s GDP [00:08:48] [00:08:50] [00:08:53]. However, Russia’s energy supply to Europe, though not economically massive, is difficult to replace [00:09:00] [00:09:03] [00:09:05] [00:09:11]. Germany, in particular, faces challenges in replacing Russian natural gas for heating and electricity, exacerbated by its decision to close nuclear plants [00:09:19] [00:09:23] [00:09:28] [00:10:06].
Broader Geopolitical Implications of a Russian Victory
A clear Russian victory would embolden China, potentially leading to an invasion of Taiwan within three years [00:10:54] [00:10:56] [00:10:59] [00:11:00] [00:11:08]. This would demonstrate that fait accompli actions can shift international borders and resolve long-standing issues [00:11:08] [00:11:11].
In this scenario, Russia’s economy would struggle, but Putin’s popularity within Russia would likely soar, as he could claim to have undone the “great geopolitical injustice” of the 1990s and restored a “Soviet Union light” without communism [00:37:33] [00:37:37] [00:37:50] [00:37:54] [00:37:56] [00:38:02] [00:38:04]. Ukraine’s rump state and Belarus would become further subordinated to Russia [00:38:53] [00:38:55]. Kazakhstan, despite recent Russian intervention to stabilize its government, did not send troops to Ukraine, and might face invasion and replacement with a more pliant government over the next five to six years in this scenario [00:38:57] [00:39:03] [00:39:05] [00:39:08] [00:39:12].
Germany would sluggishly begin rearming, leading to political struggles for supremacy between France and Germany within the EU [00:39:44] [00:39:46] [00:39:48] [00:39:52] [00:39:57]. A strong German military could be detrimental to EU unity, potentially causing countries to prioritize NATO over the EU for security [00:40:34] [00:40:36] [00:40:39] [00:40:43] [00:40:45]. NATO would likely be revived, with Finland and Sweden possibly considering joining in response to a new Cold War-like environment [00:40:50] [00:40:53] [00:40:57] [00:41:02] [00:41:19] [00:41:21] [00:41:23] [00:41:24]. Turkey, however, might continue to play both sides, potentially reopening trade with Russia [00:41:06] [00:41:08] [00:41:10] [00:41:11].
2. Stalemate
This is considered the “most unhappy scenario,” where Ukraine becomes a “European Syria” with constant fighting [00:11:19] [00:11:22] [00:11:26].
Characteristics of a Stalemate
This scenario involves ongoing conflict with Russian forces, including proxy forces like Chechen troops, and the emergence of Russia-aligned Islamist Chechen groups for plausible deniability [00:11:29] [00:11:31] [00:11:35] [00:11:42] [00:11:47] [00:11:54]. Private Military Corporations (PMCs) like Russia’s Wagner group, with veterans from Syria and Libya, would also be active [00:12:23] [00:12:25] [00:12:28] [00:12:31] [00:12:36] [00:12:38]. The sanctions would persist, damaging Russia economically but not enough for a pull-out [00:13:01] [00:13:03] [00:13:06]. Politically, Putin could not pull out without appearing to lose the war, which would threaten his position [00:13:08] [00:13:11] [00:13:31] [00:13:34] [00:13:36].
The Ukrainian state, being fundamentally weak, would likely see its forces fragment [00:14:01] [00:14:03] [00:14:05]. Nationalist extremism, such as the Azov Brigades, would proliferate on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides [00:14:06] [00:14:09] [00:14:21] [00:14:24]. Massive amounts of weapons would continue to flow into the country, primarily from Western nations [00:14:34] [00:14:36] [00:14:39]. Turkey, already supplying drones to Ukraine, could become indirectly involved or even send its forces into Ukraine with its own agenda [00:14:41] [00:14:46] [00:14:48] [00:14:51] [00:14:53] [00:14:56].
This stalemate would lead to bombed-out cities, millions of refugees, and a risk of ethnic cleansing, resembling another Yugoslavia, but with a larger population and more destructive weaponry [00:15:29] [00:15:32] [00:15:34] [00:15:36] [00:15:38] [00:15:41] [00:15:43] [00:15:45] [00:15:47].
3. Russian Defeat
This scenario is considered the least likely, but its implications are severe [00:27:24] [00:27:26].
Causes and Consequences of Russian Defeat
A Russian defeat would likely occur if Western sanctions proved crippling, leading to a free-falling economy and demands for new leadership that toppled Putin’s government [00:27:55] [00:27:56] [00:27:58] [00:28:01] [00:28:03] [00:28:08]. The immediate effect would be a retreat of Russian generals and a struggle for power within Russia, possibly forming an interim military council [00:28:15] [00:28:18] [00:28:21] [00:28:24] [00:28:25].
The most terrible outcome of a prolonged power struggle would be a civil war in a nuclear-armed country [00:28:34] [00:28:37]. This problem would be as great, if not greater, than a Russian victory for the world [00:28:41] [00:28:43]. While it might lead to the return of Crimea to Ukraine and a restoration of pre-2014 borders, Ukraine would then be adjacent to the most unstable region on the planet [00:28:49] [00:28:51] [00:28:55] [00:28:58] [00:29:00] [00:29:03].
Limited Russian Win (Putin retains power)
If the situation proves too difficult, Putin could opt to annex only Luhansk and Donetsk. This would be a strategic defeat for Russia, making it a weaker power, but with sufficient domestic media control, Putin could claim it as a victory and stay in power [00:25:17] [00:25:20] [00:25:26] [00:25:28] [00:25:30] [00:25:32] [00:25:38] [00:26:24] [00:26:27] [00:26:30] [00:26:32] [00:26:35]. In this scenario, the remaining Ukraine would likely join NATO or invite American and Turkish troops, marking an absolute strategic defeat for Russia [00:26:48] [00:26:50] [00:26:51] [00:26:53] [00:26:56] [00:27:00] [00:27:02].
Military Strategy and Observations
Russian forces have shown restraint in the initial stages, with relatively modest casualties on both sides [00:19:11] [00:19:13] [00:19:15]. There has been no mass artillery use, limited air power, and critical infrastructure like hospitals and power plants were not immediately targeted, unlike in past U.S. invasions [00:21:29] [00:21:32] [00:21:34] [00:21:43] [00:21:45] [00:21:47] [00:21:51] [00:21:52] [00:21:55]. This restraint suggests Russia’s intent to seize territory and annex it, rather than destroy infrastructure it intends to use [00:22:50] [00:22:53] [00:23:04] [00:23:06] [00:23:08]. There’s also a belief within Russia that they are “liberators” reunifying “lost Russian lands,” leading to a reluctance to destroy infrastructure [00:23:16] [00:23:18] [00:23:22] [00:23:25] [00:23:27].
However, there’s no widespread evidence of Russians being greeted as liberators, even in eastern Ukraine [00:24:05] [00:24:07] [00:24:09]. Crimea, annexed in 2014, has experienced no insurgency, suggesting a majority of its population may have genuinely desired to join Russia [00:24:34] [00:24:36] [00:24:40] [00:24:42] [00:24:44] [00:24:46] [00:24:50] [00:24:51] [00:24:53] [00:24:55] [00:24:58] [00:25:01] [00:25:03].
Both Russia and Ukraine appear to have miscalculated the nature of the war [00:31:55] [00:31:57]. Russians expected to be greeted as liberators, while Ukrainians thought they only needed to endure the first few days [00:32:06] [00:32:08] [00:32:10] [00:32:13] [00:32:15]. Ukraine’s failure to pre-position forces for a fallback to the west of Kyiv and prepare for regrouping and counter-attacks with incoming Western supplies is a significant critique of their strategy [00:31:06] [00:31:08] [00:31:11] [00:31:12] [00:31:15] [00:31:16] [00:31:18] [00:31:21] [00:31:23] [00:31:25] [00:31:28] [00:31:31].
Broader International Implications
The Taiwan Question
A decisive Russian victory in Ukraine would embolden China to pursue an invasion of Taiwan in the near future [00:10:54] [00:10:56] [00:11:00] [00:11:03] [00:11:06] [00:11:08]. The Chinese government has been preparing its People’s Liberation Army for a Taiwan invasion for 25 years [00:43:41] [00:43:43] [00:43:45]. Political incentives within China, especially amid sluggish economic growth, favor excessive nationalism and a desire to demonstrate China’s strength [00:44:00] [00:44:02] [00:44:04] [00:44:06]. Putin notably waited until after the Chinese games to initiate the invasion, suggesting Chinese assurances of financial and political backing [00:44:09] [00:44:11] [00:44:13] [00:44:15] [00:44:28] [00:44:30] [00:44:32] [00:44:34]. China has not ceased trade with Russia and abstained from criticizing its actions at the Security Council [00:44:36] [00:44:39] [00:44:41] [00:44:43] [00:44:45] [00:44:46] [00:44:49].
However, an argument against a near-term invasion of Taiwan is that China’s power is rapidly increasing, and time is on its side, unlike Russia, which was at its peak relative strength to Ukraine this year [00:45:19] [00:45:21] [00:45:24]. Chinese culture values the general who wins without fighting, preferring to wait for conditions to be fully favorable [00:45:29] [00:45:32] [00:45:34] [00:45:37] [00:45:41] [00:45:44] [00:45:46]. The correlation of forces is expected to favor China for the next 15 to 20 years, making a rushed invasion unnecessary [00:45:48] [00:45:50] [00:45:52].
Risk of Insurgency
The likelihood of a mass insurgency in Ukraine following a Russian victory is debated [00:41:47] [00:41:50]. Modern countries, unlike historically tribal societies like Vietnam or Afghanistan, have fewer young men and may be “too soft” for the realities of a hot insurgency [00:16:32] [00:16:34] [00:16:36] [00:16:39] [00:16:41] [00:16:42] [00:16:43] [00:16:46] [00:16:48] [00:16:52] [00:16:54] [00:16:57] [00:17:00] [00:17:01] [00:17:03] [00:17:52] [00:17:53] [00:17:56] [00:17:58] [00:18:01] [00:18:03] [00:18:05] [00:18:08] [00:18:10] [00:18:12] [00:18:15] [00:18:18] [00:18:20] [00:18:23] [00:18:25]. Ukraine’s labor force has largely left the country, further draining potential manpower reserves [00:17:03] [00:17:06] [00:17:08] [00:17:10] [00:17:12] [00:17:14] [00:42:55] [00:42:57]. An insurgency would likely bleed Ukrainian manpower as people seek safety and economic opportunity in Europe [00:43:00] [00:43:02] [00:43:04] [00:43:06].
If Ukraine is fully occupied, Russia would likely secure the border to stop weapon flows, making significant resistance challenging without a very young population [00:42:05] [00:42:08] [00:42:09] [00:42:12] [00:42:15].
Nuclear Escalation
The risk of nuclear escalation always looms, with the potential for hundreds of millions of deaths [00:34:31] [00:34:34] [00:34:36] [00:34:37]. While there’s no obvious ladder for Putin to use tactical nukes against Ukraine, as he could flatten Kyiv with conventional artillery if desired [00:35:09] [00:35:10] [00:35:13] [00:35:15] [00:35:17] [00:35:18]. However, if Poland were to intervene in Ukraine, the risk of Russia invading Poland and potentially using tactical nuclear weapons could escalate the conflict severely [00:35:26] [00:35:28] [00:35:32] [00:35:34] [00:35:41] [00:35:43] [00:35:45] [00:35:47] [00:35:49] [00:35:52] [00:35:55] [00:35:58] [00:35:59] [00:36:01] [00:36:07] [00:36:08] [00:36:10] [00:36:13] [00:36:14] [00:36:16].