From: jimruttshow8596
The Russian invasion of Ukraine began with Russian forces entering Ukraine and seizing several important cities, roads, and routes, though major urban centers like Kyiv remained under Ukrainian government control in the initial days [00:01:36]. On paper, the balance of power immensely favored the Russians, with superior equipment and personnel [00:02:10].
Observed Tactics and Restraint (Initial Phase)
Early observations noted a surprising level of restraint in the Russian approach:
- Limited Artillery and Air Power There was no evidence of mass artillery use or significant air power deployment [00:21:32].
- Infrastructure Intact Hospitals and power plants were not targeted or taken out, a contrast to operations like the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 or the Kosovo campaign [00:21:47]. Essential services like the internet in Kyiv largely remained operational [00:22:28].
- Modest Casualties In the initial days, both Russian and Ukrainian casualties appeared to be modest [00:19:13].
This initial restraint was attributed to two main reasons:
- Rational Objective A desire not to destroy infrastructure in cities Russia intended to occupy and use [00:23:04].
- Belief in Liberation A segment of Russia’s population and leadership genuinely believed they were “liberators” reunifying lost Russian lands and saving the Ukrainian people from a corrupt Western-compromised government. This perception made it difficult to plan for destructive tactics like taking out hospitals or the internet [00:23:16].
Strategic Objectives and Future Tactics
In a scenario of Russian victory, the military objectives include:
- Tolerable Casualties Russia is capable of absorbing higher casualties than Western countries due to its political system [00:02:46].
- Occupation and Rump State Russia aims to occupy the eastern half of Ukraine, with the western half potentially surrendering or becoming a rump state. The territory west of Kyiv is considered more defensible than the east [00:04:23].
- Puppet States and Annexation Russia plans to establish puppet states and likely integrate the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, which have historically sought to join the Russian Federation, just as Crimea did [00:04:42] [00:05:08].
- Escalation of Force It was anticipated that the initial restraint would cease, with artillery being used on urban centers, consistent with Russian doctrine for cities offering resistance, as demonstrated in the Chechen War’s flattening of Grozny [00:19:20].
Troop Composition and Manpower
- Trained Forces Russia possesses a “small but very competent, very highly trained force,” developed over a decade of continuous warfare [00:12:45].
- Troop Quality in Invasion The invasion began with Russia deploying its “lower quality troops” [00:12:55].
- Reserved Forces A significant portion (arguably a third) of Russia’s best-trained units and equipment had not been committed in the early stages of the conflict [00:33:14].
- Proxy Forces and PMC Russian tactics may include the deployment of proxy forces, such as Russia-aligned Islamist Chechen groups, to provide plausible deniability for actions, similar to the Yugoslav Wars [00:11:31]. Russia’s Wagner Group, a technically private military corporation comprising Russian veterans, has been observed in Ukraine, having previously operated in Syria, Libya, and Sudan [00:12:23].
Broader Strategic Implications
- Long-term Economic Shift A victorious Russia would face significant financial isolation but would increasingly lean on China economically, becoming a “petrol state” exporting to China via Arctic ports and pipelines instead of Europe [00:05:43].
- Geopolitical Repercussions A Russian victory could embolden China, potentially leading to an invasion of Taiwan within three years, as it would demonstrate the possibility of altering international borders through a fait accompli [00:10:56].
- Internal Russian Politics While sanctions would inflict economic damage, it is unlikely to lead to Putin’s downfall via financial oligarchs, who have experienced financial pain and purges for two decades. Putin would likely only lose power if he is perceived to have lost the war [00:13:01].
- Media Control To maintain domestic support after a less-than-total victory, Putin would likely amp up media control, potentially disconnecting Russia from the Western internet and blocking non-Russian social media [00:25:38].
- Nuclear Escalation The potential for nuclear escalation remains a looming concern, particularly if NATO members like Poland were to directly intervene militarily in Ukraine, risking a direct confrontation with Russia [00:34:26]. Previous military exercises, such as Russia’s Zapad 2008, simulated the use of tactical nuclear warheads near Warsaw, with Polish exercises confirming similar rapid overrun scenarios [00:35:34].
- Revival of NATO A strong Russian victory and dominance in Ukraine would likely reverse the “Trumpian debacle” around NATO, leading to its revival [00:40:57]. Finland and Sweden might consider joining NATO in such a scenario, facing a new Cold War-like reality [00:41:19].
Contrasting Ukrainian Response
Despite the Russian advantage, the Ukrainian government “surprised many observers by lasting as long as it has” [00:01:55]. Ukraine’s public relations and morale-keeping efforts were praised [00:18:55]. However, the Ukrainian state is considered “fundamentally weak,” and its forces could fragment in a prolonged conflict [00:14:01]. The lack of military preparedness for a fallback to the west, particularly moving forces from eastern entrenched positions, was highlighted as a major strategic miscalculation by the Ukrainian government [00:31:11]. Both Russia and Ukraine were seen as having profoundly miscalculated the nature of the conflict, with Russia expecting to be greeted as liberators and Ukraine expecting Russia to give up after initial resistance [00:31:55].