From: jimruttshow8596
The ongoing Russia-Ukraine War offers significant lessons for military strategists considering a potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait. These lessons span from the utility of military stockpiles and the nature of modern warfare to the importance of reserves and the transformative impact of drone technology.
Key Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War Applicable to Taiwan
Obsolete Stockpiles and Rapid Technological Evolution
Military stockpiles, particularly of older equipment like tanks, have proven far less useful than previously assumed due to the high rate of attrition in drone-intensified warfare and the rapid pace of technological change [00:02:41]. The next war will likely be waged with even more transformed technological tools, making it difficult to stockpile in advance [00:03:17]. For instance, Ukraine is now producing 80,000 suicide drones a month, a massive scaling up of production previously thought impossible [00:03:42]. Decision-makers globally may be underselling this transformation, partly due to the challenge of admitting that existing product lines for traditional military corporations are obsolete [00:04:06].
The Return of Peer-to-Peer Warfare
Most fighting since World War II has involved one side being considerably more sophisticated than the other [00:05:01]. The Russia-Ukraine War is considered the first major peer or near-peer level conflict since World War II [00:05:09]. This has exposed weaknesses in assumptions held by stronger powers. For example, GPS-guided munitions, effective against less technologically advanced foes like Iraq, were quickly jammed by Russia, rendering systems like HIMARS rockets almost useless [00:05:52].
The conflict highlights a shift between offensive and defensive dominance, often driven by technology [00:11:21]. Just as the Minie ball transformed Civil War tactics, making defense usually victorious [00:13:30], drones and inexpensive anti-tank weapons have made traditional mobile tank warfare less effective [00:15:26]. While the US had success with AirLand Battle tactics in the Gulf War and Iraq using air power and tanks against non-peer opponents [00:15:51], this model has not held in Ukraine [00:16:45].
Russian Miscalculations and Their Implications
Four factors contributed to Russia’s initial miscalculations in Ukraine:
- Underestimation of Ukrainian Leadership Resilience: Russia gambled that Ukraine’s leadership would flee, similar to the collapse of the Afghan government [00:07:44]. Instead, Ukraine’s leadership and military resisted, having extensively pursued training, modern equipment, and security sweeps since 2014 to counter Russian influence [00:17:27].
- Overestimation of Mobile Warfare: Russia, like many others, overestimated the effectiveness of mobile warfare with tanks on the plains of Ukraine [00:09:16]. This terrain, historically suited for massive tank battles like Kursk [00:09:49], proved vulnerable to modern anti-tank weapons and drones, leading to positional warfare [00:10:44].
- Ukrainian National Unity and Military Preparedness: Contrary to Russian assumptions, Ukraine had actively prepared its military and purged Russian sympathizers from its government [00:17:11]. The harsh reality of Russian-backed regimes in Donbas further solidified anti-Russian sentiment even among ethnic Russians in Ukraine [00:17:51].
- Russian Military Corruption: The extent of corruption within the Russian military was much higher than anticipated by both Western analysts and Russia itself [00:19:12]. This led to supply shortages and logistical failures, causing the Russian advance to stall due to self-exhaustion rather than just Ukrainian counter-offensives [00:20:00]. This includes issues like cheap, unreliable tires on military vehicles due to corrupt supply sergeants [00:20:41].
Logistics and Reserves
The war highlighted the critical importance of ready reserves. Ukraine successfully mobilized its reserve force from 200,000 to 700,000 by July 2022, giving them a significant numerical advantage until Russia’s later mobilization [00:21:40]. This suggests that countries like the US, with relatively smaller reserves, may be under-reserved for a future peer-to-peer conflict [00:22:51]. The war also underscores that peer-to-peer wars can be multi-year slugfests, unlike many short conflicts since World War II [00:24:55]. This reinforces the need for both ready and inactive reserves that can be deployed over time [00:25:05].
The conflict has also reignited the debate on conscription. Ukraine’s defense relied on instituting a wide draft [00:25:47]. Many countries that abolished mandatory military service in the 1990s and 2000s may consider bringing it back, including those in Europe and Asia [00:26:28].
Demographic Realities
Both Ukraine and Russia are “old countries” with high average ages (40.5 for Ukraine, 40.7 for Russia) [00:28:48]. This war might be the first where more 40-year-olds are dying than 18-year-olds [00:29:12]. This demographic trend is not unique, as many European and Asian countries face declining fertility rates, leading to aging populations [00:29:41]. In a long-term peer-to-peer conflict, population numbers will matter [00:31:54].
Drone Warfare and its Impact on Air and Naval Power
The rapid evolution of drones has been a major transformation. Drones can be built from off-the-shelf electronics [00:35:15]. Highly skilled drone pilots can gain thousands of hours of combat experience with little risk to their own lives, potentially leading to “crack” drone pilots with astounding kill ratios [00:36:11]. Younger individuals might have an advantage due to faster response times and higher neuroplasticity [00:37:15].
Drones have significantly muted the relevance of traditional manned air forces in the Ukraine War [00:42:05]. Jet fighters and aircraft carriers, pillars of 20th-century warfare, may become obsolete or too risky to use in peer-to-peer combat due to the effectiveness of modern anti-air and anti-ship systems [00:44:51]. This presents a challenge for militaries heavily invested in such platforms, like the US, where institutional pressure from pilot corps resists this shift [00:43:10]. The economic exchange ratio between inexpensive drones (2 million) or aircraft carriers ($25 billion) makes these platforms unsustainable in prolonged peer-to-peer conflicts [00:46:13].
Autonomous Drones: While full autonomy for ground vehicles or complex aerial combat is still incremental, the forcing function of electronic countermeasures (ECM) makes true autonomy increasingly valuable [00:53:41]. As communication links are jammed, the ability for drones to operate independently becomes crucial [00:54:05]. The lower standard of “good enough” for military applications (compared to safety for civilians) could accelerate the deployment of autonomous hunter-killer drones [00:55:01].
The Enduring Role of Artillery
Despite technological advancements, artillery remains “the queen of battle” [00:49:47]. Millions of artillery shells have been expended in Ukraine [01:05:12]. Artillery shells are “dumb drones” largely immune to ECM, making them effective in positional warfare where maneuver is difficult due to surveillance and suicide drones [01:06:16]. Surveillance drones can also provide live targeting updates for artillery [01:07:33]. The war has strained global artillery shell production, highlighting the need for increased industrial capacity [01:08:40].
Industrial Production as a Pillar of War
The Russia-Ukraine War is fundamentally a “war of production” [01:10:39]. Countries now understand the necessity of building their own drones and other military equipment, as relying on allies for rapid technological adaptation or sustained supply is insufficient [01:40:40]. The US has seen its industrial base decline, making it difficult to ramp up production of key military assets like ships [01:11:53]. In a long war, quantity, alongside quality, will be decisive [01:12:30].
Applying Lessons to the Taiwan Strait
Geopolitical Calculus
Countries that might side with China now understand that sanctions only matter if both China and the US impose them [01:13:11]. If only sanctioned by the US and its allies, an economy can still survive with China’s support [01:13:23]. This could influence governments trying to balance relations between the US and China, potentially leading some to remain neutral or even side with China [01:13:40].
Chinese Military Readiness
The Ukraine War has demonstrated that an untested military cannot be relied upon [01:13:55]. China’s military (PLA), despite significant hardware investments, lacks recent combat experience [01:14:49]. Its bureaucratic and logistical systems are likely a “mess” and untested, prone to the same corruption and careerism seen in other bureaucracies [01:15:02]. While Chinese military technology quality might be underestimated, the functionality of its overall bureaucratic machine is highly suspect without stress tests [01:15:37].
Autocratic Regimes and Public Support
The Russian experience shows that autocratic countries can effectively rally their populations behind aggressive wars, contrary to theories predicting internal dissent [01:16:35]. This suggests that if China were to wage an aggressive war, public opinion would likely harden in support of the conflict, making an internal overthrow of the CCP unlikely [01:17:08].
Drone Invasion Scenario
The short distance across the Taiwan Strait makes it highly susceptible to mass drone attacks [01:17:41]. An invasion might involve hundreds of thousands of drones swarming the island, potentially disseminating information like curfews to psychologically disorient and control the population [01:17:54]. The sheer quantity of drones would overwhelm Taiwan’s air defenses [01:18:02]. While China might prefer to limit civilian casualties for ideological reasons (framing it as a “policing action” of a rebelling province) [01:19:25], the military capability for such an aggressive approach exists [01:19:56].
Amphibious Assault Challenges
The Ukraine War has shown a relative lack of amphibious warfare, even where geographically plausible (e.g., Crimea, Odessa) [01:21:38]. The observed favoring of the defensive in this war, combined with the inherent difficulties of amphibious operations (which are much harder than land invasions) [01:22:26], likely discourages China from a direct amphibious assault on Taiwan [01:22:18].
Precision, inexpensive, asymmetric weapons, like Ukraine’s domestically produced Neptune anti-ship missiles, have effectively driven the Russian Navy from the eastern Black Sea [01:22:50]. Taiwan could similarly build a counter-force of thousands of Harpoon-equivalent anti-ship missiles for a fraction of its GDP, capable of devastating an attacking Chinese fleet [01:23:36].
Naval Blockade and Autonomous Submersibles
Instead of a direct amphibious invasion, China might consider an interdiction or blockade strategy [01:24:56]. However, traditional surface navies (like China’s) would still be vulnerable to asymmetric attacks from Taiwan’s anti-ship missiles or US attack submarines [01:25:06].
A significant development for the Taiwan Strait is the potential for autonomous submersible vehicles [01:24:21]. China could deploy thousands of these drones to surround, interdict, and blockade the island [01:25:54]. These could act as self-deploying mines with simple AI, programmed to collide with any vessel entering a declared “Red Zone” [01:25:56]. This would, in turn, spark an arms race in underwater detection and counter-measures [01:26:11].