From: jimruttshow8596
The Russia-Ukraine War has provided significant lessons regarding military logistics and the importance of reserves, particularly in a peer-to-peer conflict. Many pre-war assumptions about military readiness and supply proved incorrect, highlighting vulnerabilities for various nations.
Obsolete Stockpiles and High Attrition Rates
One major lesson is that military stockpiles, especially of older equipment, are far less useful than previously assumed [0:03:35]. The rate of attrition in modern, drone-intensified warfare is extremely high for various equipment, including tanks, trucks, and artillery shells [0:02:51]. This demands huge quantities of consumables, making it “impossible to stockpile for the next War” as the technological landscape transforms rapidly [0:03:14]. For example, the rapid evolution of drone technology, with Ukraine producing 80,000 suicide drones a month, demonstrates the obsolescence of fixed stockpiles [0:03:37].
Decision-makers are perceived as downplaying this transformation, possibly to avoid admitting that existing product lines from major military contractors are obsolete [0:04:00]. This rapid technological change makes it nearly impossible to predict future needs even two years out [0:04:46].
Russian Logistical Failures and Corruption
The war revealed significant miscalculations on the Russian side, particularly concerning their logistical capabilities and internal corruption [0:19:00].
- Overestimation of Mobile Warfare: The Russians, like many others, greatly overestimated the effectiveness of mobile warfare with tanks on the plains of Ukraine, a terrain that historically saw massive tank battles [0:09:16]. However, the advent of inexpensive anti-tank weapons and drones has rendered this strategy less effective, leading to a return to positional warfare [0:10:46], [1:06:56].
- Corruption Impact: The assumed low level of corruption in the Russian military was a grave error [0:19:10]. Reforms initiated in the early 2000s failed to address deep-seated rot, leading to widespread supply shortages [0:19:30]. For instance, corrupt supply sergeants reportedly sold off good Russian-made tires for military vehicles, replacing them with cheap Chinese knockoffs, leading to major issues like flat tires on armored personnel carriers and fuel trucks [0:20:41], [0:21:22].
- Supply Line Exhaustion: The Russian offensive quickly extended beyond its supply lines after a modest incursion into Ukraine, which is Europe’s second-largest country [0:20:03]. This logistical failure, rather than a Ukrainian counter-offensive, largely halted their initial advance [0:19:58].
The Critical Role of Reserves and Mobilization
The Ukraine-Russia War also underscored the vital importance of having substantial military reserves and the capability for rapid mobilization.
- Ukrainian Mobilization Success: While Russia initially attacked with a relatively small force of 200,000 against a similarly sized Ukrainian active military, Ukraine rapidly expanded its fighting force from 200,000 to 700,000 by July 2022 due to its massive reserve force [0:21:40], [0:21:47], [0:22:13]. This numerical advantage on the ground significantly contributed to stalling the Russian advance [0:22:15].
- US Reserve Concerns: In contrast, the US Army Reserve is about 180,000, the Marine Corps Reserve 100,000, and the Air Force Reserve 70,000, totaling a smaller absolute number than Ukraine’s reserve force, despite the US having a population seven to eight times larger [0:22:51], [0:23:03]. This suggests the US might be “well under reserved” for future peer-to-peer conflicts [0:23:19].
- Conscription’s Return: The notion that professionalized militaries made conscription obsolete has been challenged [0:25:27]. Ukraine’s defense could not have been sustained without its ability to institute a wide draft [0:25:43]. This has led to discussions globally, especially in Europe and Asia, about bringing back or extending mandatory military service [0:26:28], [0:26:51].
- Long-Term Warfare: Most post-World War II conflicts have been relatively short [0:24:25]. However, peer-to-peer wars could extend for years, making deep stacks of ready and inactive reserves indispensable [0:24:55], [0:25:11].
The Age of Combatants and Demographic Decline
A unique aspect of the Ukraine-Russia War is the relatively high average age of combatants [0:28:13]. Both Ukraine (average age 40.5) and Russia (average age 40.7) are demographically older countries in decline [0:28:48]. This is possibly the first war where more 40-year-olds are dying than 18-year-olds, with 50-year-olds also serving in roles like driving supply trucks [0:29:12], [0:29:19]. This demographic reality raises questions about the optimal age for different combat roles, suggesting that younger individuals might be better suited for roles requiring fast response times, like drone piloting [0:37:15], [0:37:47].
Production as a Decisive Factor
The Ukraine-Russia War is fundamentally a war of production, where the quantity of artillery shells, artillery pieces, and drones built is decisive [1:10:42].
- Artillery Shortages: Russia, relying on its stockpiles, quickly ran out of artillery shells and had to purchase them from North Korea [1:05:27], [1:05:33]. Similarly, Ukraine’s reliance on Soviet-caliber artillery led to shortages, necessitating supplies from allies like South Korea and NATO countries, rapidly draining their own stockpiles [1:08:00], [1:08:42].
- Industrial Base Concerns: The US’s decreased industrial base, particularly in areas like shipbuilding, raises concerns about its ability to sustain a prolonged peer-to-peer conflict [1:11:40], [1:11:47]. China, in contrast, has a massive shipbuilding capacity that can be converted to military production during wartime [1:12:03].
Lessons for Potential Conflicts (e.g., Straits of Taiwan)
The lessons from Ukraine apply directly to other potential flashpoints like the Straits of Taiwan:
- Sanctions Efficacy: Countries now know that sanctions only matter if both China and the US impose them [1:13:11]. If a country is sanctioned only by the US and its allies, but not China, its economy can survive [1:13:21].
- Untested Military Concerns: An untested military cannot be relied upon [1:13:55]. China’s military, despite its hardware, has not undergone significant stress tests or large-scale combat since the Korean War, raising questions about its bureaucratic functionality and logistical capabilities [1:14:49], [1:15:37].
- Autocratic Regime Stability: Theories that an aggressive war would lead to internal overthrow of autocratic regimes (e.g., Putin’s Russia) have been disproven [1:16:35]. Public opinion in Russia hardened over time, suggesting similar trends could occur in China [1:16:59].
- Amphibious Operations Risks: The war’s favorability towards the defensive makes an amphibious invasion, like a Chinese assault on Taiwan, even more difficult and risky [1:22:08], [1:22:15]. Ukraine’s success in driving the Russian Navy out of the eastern Black Sea using inexpensive anti-ship missiles demonstrates how vulnerable surface fleets are to asymmetric attacks [1:22:50]. This suggests Taiwan could build a powerful counter-force at a fraction of the cost, making traditional naval interdiction highly dangerous for an aggressor [1:23:36], [1:25:04].