From: jimruttshow8596
The Russia-Ukraine conflict, which began in February 2022, has been a significant point of discussion, with experts analyzing its progression and broader implications for global military conflicts [00:01:16].
Initial Assessments and Current Situation
Early in the conflict, the common view in the West suggested that Ukraine had performed better than expected, while Russia had underperformed [00:01:53]. However, Samo Burja, founder of Bismarck Analysis, observed a slow but steady Russian advance, consistent with expectations for mechanized warfare and city sieges [00:02:26]. He noted the French Defense Ministry’s reports as a particularly accurate Western source, which indicated that a tragic scenario was unfolding [00:02:56].
Burja predicted that Russia would eventually slog through several Ukrainian cities, using an artillery-heavy method of warfare pioneered in the Chechen War to level cities and expedite capture [00:03:36]. This “belt strategy” involves staying back 15-20 kilometers to prevent counterattacks, then using heavy artillery to grind down defenses [00:04:00].
Constraints on Russian Tactics: “Maximum Acceptable Atrocity”
A potential restraint on Russia’s destructive tactics is the concept of “maximum acceptable atrocity” [00:04:35]. This suggests that there is a level of atrocity that would force Western public opinion to demand active intervention, which Russia would likely want to avoid given its military’s underperformance against potential Western air power [00:04:47].
However, Burja countered that political interest, rather than moral outrage, primarily drives intervention [00:05:58]. While civilian casualties are a political liability, he believes they do not directly translate into Western military intervention through public opinion alone [00:06:43]. Instead, they might lead to new rounds of sanctions [00:07:07]. An example of public opinion swaying policy was the Kosovo secession from Serbia, where mounting atrocities eventually led to Western intervention despite initial government reluctance [00:07:33]. Burja maintained that only the use of novel weapons, such as chemical, biological, or nuclear arms, would be sufficient to trigger such intervention [00:09:10].
Status of the Russian Offensive
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) posited that the Russian offensive had failed and reached a “stalemate” or “culmination,” meaning they could not push much further at that time [00:10:14]. This is typical of modern warfare, where pushes are followed by periods of friction and stabilization [00:10:43].
Despite this, Burja still anticipated more territorial gains for Russia in eastern Ukraine within the next 20 days [00:12:12]. While a swift capture of Kyiv was deemed unlikely in the short term, he expected fighting to eventually reach the capital, as a significant symbolic victory is necessary for Russia’s domestic politics [00:12:28]. Overall, Burja assessed the current situation as a “moderate Ukrainian defeat” [00:26:55].
Western Response: Network Power and Sanctions
The West’s response to the conflict has been described as unprecedented, involving severe sanctions by many economically significant global players and voluntary pullbacks by numerous companies [00:12:56]. Burja identified this as a new expression of soft power, now understood as “network power” [00:13:50]. Social media, particularly Twitter, significantly accelerated the communication latency and consensus among Western organizations, leading to a much sharper and faster response than would have been possible otherwise [00:14:20].
The sanctions were believed to have already caused serious harm to the Russian economy, with the aim of limiting Russia’s future military potential, rather than immediately stopping the current war [00:19:03]. It was noted that while about half of the sanctions imposed by companies had “teeth” (incurring real economic costs), the other half were largely symbolic [00:20:16].
Prospects for Conflict Settlement
Most wars do not end in total victory [00:21:07]. Burja anticipated that Russia would occupy a substantial portion of Ukrainian territory and would not retreat [00:21:45]. This could involve Russia maintaining military personnel while acknowledging Ukrainian nominal control, or setting up new puppet states [00:22:02].
An optimistic scenario for Ukraine involves losing some territory, particularly in the east, but continuing to receive high-tech weapons and economic integration from the West, leading to a well-armed and secure country [00:22:50].
Regarding a negotiated end to the hot war, Burja predicted a “never-ending ceasefire” rather than a formal peace treaty, similar to the Donbas situation post-2014 [00:24:00]. A formal treaty would imply a loss of face for Ukraine, which continues to claim its internationally recognized borders, including Crimea and Donbas [00:24:20]. Russia is also unlikely to offer terms that would satisfy Ukraine’s demands for a full withdrawal [00:24:43].
A hypothetical settlement proposal included Crimea going to Russia, Donbas provinces remaining with Ukraine but receiving substantial autonomy, and Ukraine agreeing not to join NATO for 15-20 years [00:27:16]. However, neither side seemed ready to accept such a compromise [00:27:41].
Potential Game-Changers in the Conflict
Several events could alter the dynamics of the conflict:
- Russian Reinvigoration: If Russia could reignite its mobile offensive and capture strategic points like Dnipro, it would cut off Ukrainian forces in Donbas, though such operations would be slow [00:30:21].
- Ukrainian Counter-attacks: If Ukraine could effectively roll back Russian forces, it would shift the balance of power and potentially increase Ukrainian goals [00:31:32]. Such a success could forge a new founding myth for Ukraine, fostering ambition and national capacity [00:32:48]. This might also destabilize the Russian Federation, potentially leading to new secessionist efforts and conflicts in regions like the Caucasus [00:33:42].
- Capture or Death of Zelenskyy: While such an event would not help Russia domestically, it would severely shake Ukraine and cause Western support to become “softer” and less reliable, as much of Ukraine’s response has been embodied in his public image [00:34:34].
- Belarusian Involvement: A Belarusian thrust, possibly with Russian support, to cut off supply lines from Poland could significantly alter the negotiating dynamics [00:36:23]. However, Burja doubted the Belarusian military’s capacity to perform well in such an operation [00:37:09].
Military Tactics and Strategies in the Ukraine War
The conflict has highlighted questions about the evolving balance between offense and defense in warfare [00:40:40]. The effectiveness of inexpensive, smart anti-asset weapons (anti-tank, anti-air missiles) against expensive assets like tanks and aircraft might suggest a shift towards defensive tactical dominance [00:42:12]. This could be due to the specific matchup of the Russian and Ukrainian militaries, which share a common military tradition but have seen Ukrainian forces receive Western training in light infantry tactics since 2014, leveraging these smart weapons [00:43:45].
Russian military underperformance has been attributed to fundamental issues in executing complex mechanized warfare operations [00:45:16]. Failures often stem from small percentages of institutional reforms being incomplete, leading to drastically reduced effectiveness [00:45:38]. While armies can “debug” and improve through battle experience, the high pace of modern kinetic warfare may not allow for the years needed for such improvements [00:47:26]. Supply chain issues for high-tech weaponry could affect both sides, potentially reverting to simpler forms of warfare that might favor Russia in the long run [00:47:52].
Lessons from the Russo-Ukrainian War and Future Implications
The primary lesson from the conflict is that “big wars still happen,” challenging the assumption of small-scale conflicts prevalent since the 1990s [00:49:25]. This suggests a world where middle powers like Russia might pursue large wars, potentially breaking the post-1945 taboo against territorial aggression [00:50:00].
The extensive network economic response by the West could be seen as a new form of collective deterrence [00:51:05]. If the penalties for aggressive war are severe enough, they might deter future conflicts by making the costs too high [00:51:44]. However, if territorial gains are still made, other countries might simply view this as a challenge to learn how to fight these wars better, minimize costs, and design their economies to be more robust against economic network attacks [00:52:12].
China’s Perspective
China will likely perceive a strong benefit in disentangling from Western economies to gain greater political freedom of action [00:52:45]. To resolve the Taiwan question, China might aim for a multi-decade policy of building global partnerships directly, bypassing global institutions, with countries in Africa, Asia, and Russia to secure resources and markets [00:53:12]. This strategy would provide the political ability to eventually retake Taiwan, which is a fundamental tenet of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy [00:53:41]. The impact of the conflict on global geopolitics is thus profound, potentially encouraging nations like China to build alternative global trade networks to resist Western economic leverage [00:54:32].