From: jimruttshow8596
This article explores various perspectives on the military strategies and tactics employed by both Russia and Ukraine, as well as the broader implications for international relations and the nature of warfare.
Current Situation and Russian Advance
At four weeks into the war, Samo Borya observed a slow Russian advance consistent with mechanized warfare and the constraints of besieging cities like Mariupol, and potentially Kyiv [00:02:26]. The Russians have captured significant territory through mobile maneuvers [00:02:48]. The French Defense Ministry’s maps and reports are considered a particularly accurate Western source, focused on reporting rather than cheerleading [00:02:54].
Borya anticipates a “tragic scenario” where Russians will “slog through” several Ukrainian cities, using a method of warfare first seen in the Chechen War: leveling cities with artillery to expedite capture [00:03:31]. This aligns with what Jim Rutt called the “belt strategy,” where Russians would maintain a distance of 15-20 kilometers and use heavy artillery, a staple of Russian doctrine since World War I and perfected in World War II [00:03:58].
However, there’s a counter-view regarding Russia’s offensive capabilities. The Institute for the Study of War suggested that the Russian offensive has failed, reaching a “stalemate or culmination” point, similar to Clausewitz’s concept of friction in war, where the advancing force cannot push further [00:10:10]. While this doesn’t mean the war is over—as modern wars often see pushes, stabilization, and then further advances or counter-offensives (e.g., World War I, World War II, Korea) [00:10:40]—it suggests the Russians may not be able to gradually grind down cities like Kyiv or capture Odesa in the short term [00:11:51].
Samo Borya still expects more Russian territorial gains in eastern Ukraine and the siege and capture of additional cities within 20 days [00:12:10]. He noted that while Kyiv might not be captured in the immediate next month, the fighting will likely reach it eventually, as a significant symbolic victory is necessary for Russian domestic politics [00:12:28].
Potential Constraints on Russian Tactics
Jim Rutt proposed the concept of “maximum acceptable atrocity” as a potential restraint on Russia’s “pound it flat” strategy [00:04:15]. This theory suggests that there is a level of atrocity that would compel Western public opinion to force active intervention, which Putin would likely want to avoid given his military’s underperformance against a potential first-class Western air power [00:04:41].
Samo Borya viewed civilian casualties and “heartbreaking images” as political liabilities for Russia, but argued that they do not inherently translate into Western intervention through public opinion alone [00:06:27]. He suggested that if Western governments are already inclined to intervene, such atrocities would lower the political cost of intervention [00:06:51]. Otherwise, they might only lead to new sanctions [00:07:07]. Rutt countered with the example of the Kosovo secession, where initial government reluctance to intervene was eventually overcome by mounting public and thought leadership pressure due to atrocities [00:07:31]. Borya conceded that the use of novel weapons (chemical, biological, nuclear) might be sufficient to trigger intervention, but believes bombed-out Eastern European cities do not significantly sway Western audiences, citing Sarajevo as an example where intervention was triggered but atrocities still occurred [00:09:09].
Potential Future Scenarios
Jim Rutt outlined several potential events that could shift the views of both sides regarding a settlement:
- Russian Reinvigoration of Offensive: Russians could potentially reinvigorate their mobile offensive to capture Dnipro, a city on the Dnieper River, which would cut off Ukrainian forces in Donbas [00:30:21]. This would be a slow slog, as Russians have not shown the blitzkrieg ability of the US military [00:31:02].
- Ukrainian Counter-attacks: Reports suggest Ukrainian counter-attacks are beginning, with claims of recapturing a town outside Kyiv and local counter-attacks in the south [00:31:32]. If Ukrainians could push Russians back on multiple fronts, it would change the dynamic, likely increasing Zelensky’s demands while making Putin more realistic [00:32:00]. Samo Borya believes a successful Ukrainian pushback would be a “new founding myth” for Ukraine, fostering ambition and national development [00:32:32]. However, it could lead to destabilization and secessionist efforts within the Russian Federation, potentially reigniting wars in regions like the Caucasus, possibly supported by an invigorated Ukraine [00:33:32].
- Zelensky Captured or Killed: The capture or death of Zelensky could significantly shake Ukraine and its government [00:34:17]. While it would generate sympathy and martyrdom in the West, it might also cause Western support to quietly wane, as much of Ukraine’s response is embodied in Zelensky’s public image [00:34:55].
- Belarusian Involvement: Belarus, with Russian support, could attempt to cut off supply lines from Poland along the Ukrainian-Polish border [00:36:23]. Samo Borya doubts the Belarusian military’s capacity for such an operation, noting a lack of evidence for institutional reform within their forces [00:36:49].
Modern Warfare Dynamics
Fifth-Generation (5G) Warfare and Network Response
The West’s response to the invasion, particularly the economic sanctions and companies pulling out of Russia, is seen as an unprecedented soft power approach, a “new expression of soft power” [00:13:50]. This has been amplified by social media, especially Twitter, which has “shortened the communication latency” and accelerated the propagation of consensus among Western organizations and the white-collar professional class [00:16:04]. This led to a much sharper and faster condemnation and response than would have otherwise occurred, exemplified by the swift decision to remove Russian banks from SWIFT [00:16:10].
However, the effectiveness of Russian psychological warfare and misinformation in the West has been surprisingly poor, leading some to question prior claims of their talent in this area [00:39:34]. Russians also appear to have not fully engaged in fifth-generation warfare by failing to destroy critical infrastructure like bridges or the internet, perhaps intending to use the infrastructure themselves [00:40:00].
Offense vs. Defense in Modern Warfare
The conflict raises questions about the changing balance between offense and defense in warfare, reminiscent of historical shifts caused by new technologies (e.g., the mini-ball rifle in the US Civil War, machine guns in World War I) [00:40:40]. The proliferation of relatively inexpensive, smart anti-asset weapons (anti-tank, anti-air, fire-and-forget missiles) may have shifted the exchange ratio, making defense dominant over offense against expensive assets like tanks, airplanes, and ships [00:42:13].
Samo Borya agrees that defense may be stronger in mechanized warfare, but less so for air supremacy strategies [00:43:01]. The surprisingly symmetrical forces of Russia and Ukraine, both stemming from a common military tradition, contribute to this dynamic [00:43:45]. Ukrainian forces, with Western training since 2014, have adopted light infantry tactics with smart weapons, proving effective against Russia’s numerical advantages and potentially disrupting their reliance on sheer weight of numbers [00:43:56].
Russian Military Underperformance
The perceived underperformance of the Russian military is attributed to the difficulty of organizing a coherent response across all levels required for mechanized warfare [00:45:06]. Samo Borya suggests that if Russia is failing, it’s due to a few remaining “debugging” problems in their military, which, if resolved through large-scale military experience, could dangerously exceed their current performance in future conflicts [00:45:47]. However, the high rate of material and personnel consumption in modern high-energy kinetic warfare means there isn’t years for improvement or for new leaders to be assessed [00:47:24].
Supply Chains and Future Warfare
European militaries are severely limited in the supplies they can provide to Ukraine due to underfunding and depleted stockpiles [00:48:04]. While the US might continuously resupply Ukraine, a scenario where both sides run out of cutting-edge munitions could lead to a simpler, more prolonged kind of warfare, which would likely favor the Russians [00:48:31].
Lessons Learned and Future Implications
The primary lesson from the conflict is that “big wars still happen” [00:49:31]. The war in Ukraine is a large conflict, suggesting a return to a world where middle powers like Russia might pursue large wars, unlike the smaller affairs seen since the 1990s [00:49:54]. This breaks a post-1945 taboo against attacking neighbors to absorb territory [00:50:24], potentially leading to a return where countries attempt to revise borders through military means [00:50:48].
The network economic response from the West could serve as a “collective deterrence of war” [00:51:10]. The severe economic costs of waging aggressive war, even if not immediately stopping the current conflict, could act as an effective deterrent in the future [00:51:44]. However, Samo Borya cautioned that if territorial gains are made, other countries might perceive this as a challenge to learn how to fight such wars better, minimizing costs, finding opportune moments, and designing their economies to be more robust against economic network attacks [00:52:12].
China, in particular, will observe the strong benefit of economically disentangling from Western economies to gain political freedom of action [00:52:45]. This could lead China to pursue multi-decade policies focused on new partnerships with African and Asian countries and Russia, bypassing global institutions to secure resources and markets to sustain its industrial base and potentially resolve the Taiwan question [00:53:11]. The conflict may reinforce China’s view that it needs to build a global trade network independent of Western influence to protect its strategic objectives [00:54:39].