From: jimruttshow8596
The Ukraine-Russia War has provided significant lessons for military strategists and observers, highlighting transformations in modern warfare and challenging long-held assumptions [01:29:00].
Key Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia War
Obsolescence of Stockpiles and Traditional Equipment
Military stockpiles of various equipment are much less useful than previously assumed [02:35:00]. The rate of attrition in drone-intensified warfare is very high for equipment like tanks, trucks, and artillery shells [02:51:00]. It is increasingly difficult to stockpile for future wars because the next conflict will likely be waged with an even more technologically transformed set of tools, making current stockpiles potentially obsolete [03:17:00].
Many decision-makers worldwide are downplaying the transformation of warfare brought about by drones, possibly due to institutional resistance from existing military-industrial complexes whose current product lines may become obsolete [04:08:00].
Return of Peer-to-Peer Warfare
The Ukraine-Russia War is considered the first major peer or near-peer level war since World War II [05:09:00]. Previous conflicts since World War II often involved one side being considerably more sophisticated than the other, leading to lazy assumptions by stronger powers [05:03:00]. For example, US munitions relying on GPS guidance proved ineffective against a technologically advanced country like Russia, which quickly figured out how to jam GPS [05:52:00].
Russian Miscalculations
Four major factors contributed to miscalculations on the Russian side:
- Assumption of Ukrainian Leadership Fleeing: Russia gambled that Ukraine’s president and leadership would flee under serious threat, akin to the collapse of the Afghanistan government [07:44:00]. This did not happen [08:20:00].
- Overestimation of Mobile Warfare: Russia greatly overestimated the effectiveness of mobile warfare, particularly tanks, even though the plains of Ukraine saw some of the biggest tank warfare in the 20th century [09:16:00]. Modern technology, such as drones and inexpensive anti-tank weapons, has rendered traditional mobile warfare with tanks less effective, shifting the advantage back to defense [15:18:00].
- Underestimation of Ukrainian Preparedness: Had the invasion occurred in 2014, Ukraine might have surrendered due to sympathizers and an unprepared military [17:11:00]. However, since 2014, Ukraine had pursued training, acquired modern equipment, and conducted security sweeps to root out Russian agents [17:24:00]. Reports from refugees in the Donbas region and the transformation of cities like Kharkiv from Russian-speaking to anti-Russian strongholds further demonstrated Ukrainian resistance [17:51:00].
- Corruption in the Russian Military: The level of corruption in the Russian military was much higher than anticipated by both Western analysts and the Russians themselves [19:08:00]. Reforms initiated in the early 2000s to streamline and modernize the military failed to eliminate widespread corruption, leading to supply shortages and logistical failures in the early stages of the war [19:15:00]. Examples include corrupt supply sergeants selling off good quality tires and replacing them with cheap, easily punctured Chinese alternatives [20:41:41].
Shift Between Offensive and Defensive Dominance
Military history shows a recurring switch between offensive and defensive dominance, often driven by technology [11:17:00].
- Napoleonic Era to US Civil War: Smoothbore muskets (75-yard effective range) favored frontal assaults [11:37:00]. The invention of the Minié ball and rifled muskets (200-yard effective range) during the US Civil War shifted the advantage to the tactical defensive [12:30:00].
- World War I: Machine guns and rapid-fire light artillery made breakthroughs exceedingly difficult on compact fronts, leading to static trench warfare [14:10:00].
- World War II: The return to mobile warfare with air power, tanks, and radio enabled rapid movement of lines, significantly increasing daily advances compared to WWI [14:37:00].
- Modern Warfare: The use of drones and inexpensive anti-tank weapons in the Ukraine-Russia War has again shifted the advantage towards defense, making traditional mobile warfare strategies based on tanks less effective [15:26:00].
Information Warfare in the 20th Century
The US military’s approach to “information warfare” in the 1980s and 1990s primarily meant adding an information layer to 20th-century warfare, not a fundamental transformation [16:35:00]. The successful US interventions in the Gulf War and 2004 Iraq, while militarily successful, used an “obsolete form of war” against opponents that were not peers [16:45:00].
The Rise of Drone Warfare
The war has seen an amazingly rapid evolution in drone technology and application [35:02:00].
Off-the-Shelf Components and Rapid Scaling
Militarily useful drones can be built from off-the-shelf electronic components, combining civilian cameras and engines with explosives [35:13:00]. Ukraine is now producing 80,000 suicide drones a month, a massive and previously unthinkable scaling of production [03:42:00]. This rapid evolution is comparable to the development of aviation during World War I, which quickly moved from reconnaissance to integrated combat roles [38:16:00].
The Role of Drone Pilots
Drone pilots’ skill matters significantly, and they can gain thousands of hours of combat flight experience with minimal risk of death by using virtual reality goggles [35:45:00]. This allows for highly skilled individuals, similar to snipers, who can achieve astounding kill ratios [36:41:00]. Younger individuals with faster response times and higher neuroplasticity may be optimal for drone piloting [37:15:00].
Obsolescence of Manned Air Forces
The relevance of traditional manned air forces (Ukrainian and Russian) has been muted during the war because drones have essentially obsoleted older types of classical manned air forces for reconnaissance and munition delivery [42:08:00]. Large, expensive fighter planes like the F-22 (costing $300 million) may become absurd in the next turn of warfare [43:40:00].
Strategic Vulnerability
The US military’s vast air power, split across the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy, consists of 20th-century air forces [42:42:00]. These are vulnerable to modern anti-air equipment, as demonstrated by Serbian forces shooting down stealth bombers with 1970s Soviet technology in the 1990s [44:57:00]. This raises questions about the survivability of even US planes against state-of-the-art anti-air systems from peer opponents like China or Russia [44:57:57].
Cost Ratios and Strategic Bombing
Smart weapons and asymmetric exchanges are rapidly changing the cost ratios in warfare [46:06:00]. For example, a 2 million Russian tank, creating a highly advantageous economic exchange ratio [46:13:00]. In a long war, such ratios can be decisive [46:27:00].
The Fate of Aircraft Carriers
Aircraft carriers are seen as a modern equivalent to World War II battleships [47:20:00]. While they confer prestige, they are too risky to use in militarily useful ways against peer opponents due to the high risk of sinking [47:31:00]. They become “empty symbols of military strength” or “sunk costs waiting to sink” in a peer-level combat scenario [47:47:00].
Autonomy in Drones and Vehicles
The progress of truly autonomous drones is expected to be incremental, similar to autonomous cars [50:11:00]. While flying is easy for computers, understanding complex battlefield situations, which lack the massive, consistent data sets available for, say, civilian traffic, is difficult [51:57:00]. Human pilots are expected to remain relevant for a longer time, primarily through remote piloting [53:11:00].
However, the rapid evolution of electronic countermeasures (ECM) makes remote piloting more difficult, increasing the premium on truly autonomous systems [54:02:00]. In warfare, there may be a greater acceptance of civilian deaths and friendly fire from autonomous systems if they are more effective or cheaper than human-operated alternatives [55:08:00]. This can be seen historically, for example, with the shift in civilian casualty acceptance from the US Civil War to World War II’s strategic bombing campaigns [56:11:00].
Artillery’s Continued Relevance
Artillery has returned as a key component in positional warfare, demanding huge quantities of shells [03:02:00]. Artillery shells are “dumb drones” that cannot be countered by electronic countermeasures, and once in the air, their final position is fixed [01:06:13]. The end of mobile warfare brings back the advantage of artillery, as troops cannot move fast enough to avoid hits, leading to the return of trench warfare [01:06:27]. Surveillance drones and artillery can be synergistically paired, with drones providing live targeting updates [01:07:33].
Human Factors and Demographic Shifts
Importance of Military Reserves and Conscription
The war highlighted the importance of ready reserves that can be deployed within months in peer-to-peer warfare [02:11:00]. Ukraine was able to rapidly increase its fighting force from 200,000 to 700,000 people by July 2022 due to its reserve force [02:47:00]. This suggests that countries like the US, with relatively small reserves, may be under-reserved for extended peer-to-peer conflicts [02:29:00].
The Ukraine war demonstrates that a total war of mobilization requires the capability to institute a wide draft [02:29:00]. Countries that abolished mandatory military service in the 1990s and early 2000s, based on the assumption of small, professional armies, may bring it back [02:50:00]. This includes European nations and potentially small states in Asia like Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea [02:57:00].
Quality vs. Quantity
In asymmetric conflicts, quality often wins [02:16:00]. However, in extended peer-to-peer slugfests, both quality and quantity are important [02:28:00]. Western European countries, with their small numbers of high-quality tanks, could be in significant trouble in a protracted peer-to-peer conflict [02:30:00].
Aging Populations in Conflict
The higher average age of populations in both Ukraine (40.5 years) and Russia (40.7 years) is a notable demographic change [02:48:00]. This might be the first war where more 40-year-olds are dying than 18-year-olds [02:59:00]. Both countries are in deep demographic decline, a trend not unique to them in the modern world [02:40:00]. Countries with very low fertility rates, like South Korea (0.7), face significant challenges in maintaining military strength in the long term [03:26:00].
Industrial Transformation and Logistics
The Ukraine-Russia War is becoming a war of production, where the ability to build more artillery shells, artillery pieces, and drones is critical [01:10:39]. Countries now recognize that for modern warfare, they must build their own drones rather than relying on allies [01:09:50]. This will lead to the creation of many new drone factories and rapid prototyping [01:09:57]. For example, an independent Ukraine could become a top global drone producer [01:11:11].
Decline of US Industrial Base
The US has given away its industrial base, making it difficult to assemble most of its own weapons in a prolonged war [01:11:40]. For instance, the US, a global naval power, has very few dry docks capable of building modern ships, ranking much lower than other countries in ship tonnage building [01:11:47]. China, in contrast, is number one in building both civilian and military ships, indicating a robust industrial capacity that can be turned to military production [01:12:03].
Implications for the Taiwan Strait Crisis
The Ukraine-Russia War provides several insights relevant to a potential conflict over the Taiwan Strait:
- Sanctions’ Limited Impact: Countries that might side with China now understand that sanctions only matter if both China and the US impose them [01:13:11]. If only sanctioned by the US and its allies, but not by China, an economy can survive [01:13:23].
- Untested Military Reliability: An untested military cannot be relied upon [01:13:55]. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not undergone stress tests from smaller conflicts, unlike the Russian military in Syria or Georgia [01:14:34]. While China has good hardware, its bureaucracy and logistical capabilities are likely a mess due to a lack of practical implementation and testing [01:15:31].
- Autocratic Regimes’ Public Opinion: Autocratic countries and those with autocratic tendencies can readily mobilize their populations for aggressive wars without fear of internal overthrow [01:16:35]. The notion that Putin would be overthrown by anti-war protests did not materialize; Russian public opinion hardened over time [01:16:52].
- Drone Swarm Invasion Scenario: The short distance across the Taiwan Strait means drones can fly over, potentially leading to a massive “electric motor airflight invasion” involving hundreds of thousands of drones [01:17:38]. These could be used for psychological warfare, issuing curfews via loudspeakers, or directly targeting individuals to prevent mobilization [01:18:05].
- Amphibious Invasion Challenges: The Ukraine war showed a relative lack of amphibious warfare, and the general favoring of defensive capabilities at a macro level goes against the Chinese attempting a large-scale amphibious invasion [01:21:38]. The problems encountered in Ukraine would be multiplied over the Strait [01:22:35]. Ukraine’s ability to drive the Russian Navy out of the eastern Black Sea with relatively inexpensive anti-ship missiles like the Neptune highlights the vulnerability of large naval fleets [01:22:50]. Taiwan could build a counter-force of thousands of Harpoon missile equivalents annually at a fraction of its GDP, potentially annihilating an invading fleet before it crosses the Strait [01:23:36].
- Autonomous Submersible Vehicles: Autonomous submersible vehicles could be deployed to blockade Taiwan, essentially acting as self-deploying, attacking mines [01:25:40]. This would create a new arms race in underwater warfare [01:26:11].