From: jimruttshow8596
Peter Turchin, a complexity scientist and founder of cliodynamics, focuses on understanding the dynamics of human societies through a scientific lens [00:00:34]. His work, including books like Historical Dynamics and War and Peace and War, has significantly influenced fields like the Game B movement [00:00:11]. His most recent book, End Times: Elites, Counter-Elites, and the Path of Political Disintegration, delves into the mechanisms of societal decline [00:01:59].
Cliodynamics: A Science of History
Cliodynamics is proposed as a science of history, motivated by the need for a rigorous, scientific approach to historical study [00:02:13]. Turchin, originally trained as a theoretical biologist, shifted his focus from animal population dynamics to the historical dynamics of human societies, seeking a new challenge [00:02:28].
The Purpose of Cliodynamics
Historically, theories of history have existed, but there was no systematic program for testing these theories against data [00:03:02]. The primary motivation for cliodynamics is to fill this gap, providing a framework to rigorously test theories and reject some in favor of others [00:03:09].
A secondary, practical motivation is to understand why large-scale societies, which are capable of providing widespread well-being, almost inevitably experience “end times” periods of social dysfunction, political disintegration, and sometimes outright collapse [00:03:38]. Just as there are sciences for human health and environmental health, there’s a need for a science of social health to understand how societies function and maintain well-being [00:04:04].
Distinguishing Cliodynamics from Other Theories
Previous theories of history include the 19th-century “Great Man Theory,” early 20th-century “social forces/structuralism,” and later “environmental determinism” as proposed by Jared Diamond [00:04:45]. Cliodynamics differs by advocating an integrative approach that considers the interplay of individuals, macro-trends, and various mechanisms [00:05:36]. It seeks to combine insights from economics, sociology, political science, and even climatology to understand societal dynamics [00:06:50]. The goal is to include only processes that empirically matter for understanding and prediction [00:07:27].
While direct experimentation with history is impossible, similar to astrophysics or evolutionary biology, cliodynamics relies on systematic data analysis to test theories [00:08:14].
Data Collection and Methodology
To conduct empirical tests, cliodynamics requires standardized, regularized, and accessible data [00:09:22]. Turchin has been involved in building massive historical databases, notably “Seshat,” which collects data on societes over the past 10,000 years, currently encompassing 500 to 600 past societies [00:15:51]. The “Crisis DB” is a supplement specifically tracking societies entering and emerging from crises [00:16:18].
Data sources are diverse, ranging from church records in England [00:11:00] to archaeological findings [00:10:41]. Proxies are crucial for measuring variables like “popular immiseration” [00:11:45]. For example, the average stature (height) of a population, derived from skeletal data in European museums, serves as a reliable proxy for biological well-being and economic conditions [00:11:50]. Studies show that average population height tends to decline in pre-crisis periods, indicating population distress [00:12:54]. For the United States, height data is adjusted for ethnic and sex differences [00:13:57].
Drivers of Societal Instability
The “End Times” phenomenon in societies is primarily driven by two ubiquitously observed factors: popular immiseration and elite overproduction [00:15:04].
Popular Immiseration
This refers to the declining economic well-being of the general population [00:21:45]. A key indicator used is the “relative wage,” calculated as the nominal wage divided by nominal GDP per capita [00:20:53]. This metric avoids the complexities of inflation adjustments and reveals how widely prosperity is shared [00:21:03].
In the United States, the relative wage has nearly halved since the 19th century [00:19:34]. Until the late 1970s, median wages increased in parallel with GDP per capita [00:21:50]. However, since then, productivity has continued to rise, but compensation has stagnated or declined [00:22:18]. This widening gap is termed the “wealth pump,” a “perverse wealth pump that takes from the poor and gives it to the rich” [00:22:41].
Historically, mechanisms for the wealth pump vary (e.g., population growth leading to depressed wages in the Middle Ages [00:23:22]), but the general pattern is that ruling elites, during periods of peace, reconfigure the economy for their own benefit [00:24:01]. This decline in relative wage increases popular discontent and creates mass mobilization potential, as people are more easily mobilized by political entrepreneurs [00:24:56]. This phenomenon can be linked to memetic desire and memetic competition, where people’s expectations of well-being are relative to others and previous generations [00:25:50]. For instance, the median worker now works 40% more to afford a house compared to 40 years ago, and college education costs have skyrocketed, making it four times harder for working families to afford [00:28:01].
Elite Overproduction
Elites are defined as a small proportion of the population concentrating social power [00:36:30]. Social power has four main forms: military (coercion), economic, political/administrative, and ideological [00:37:28]. In democratic capitalist societies, governing elites are typically a coalition of economic and administrative/political elites [00:37:57]. The United States, in particular, is argued to be a plutocracy, where economic elites dominate [00:38:28].
Elite overproduction occurs when the number of “elite aspirants” significantly outnumbers the available “positions of power” (the “musical chairs” analogy) [00:17:14]. While some competition is healthy, excessive competition disrupts social norms and the political process [00:17:42]. For example, the number of deca-millionaires in the US has increased tenfold in the last 40 years, while the number of political positions remains constant [00:43:08]. This leads to a surge in frustrated elite aspirants [00:44:44].
These “failed aspirant elites” are often intelligent, ambitious, well-educated, and well-connected [00:47:09]. They have a strong incentive to use their skills to “get ahead of the game,” becoming a primary source of potential revolutionaries and radicals [00:47:27]. Lawyers, for instance, are identified as a particularly dangerous profession in this regard, with figures like Lenin, Castro, and Robespierre being lawyers [00:47:32]. These “counter-elites” provide the organization needed to mobilize popular discontent, forming an “explosive mixture” [00:48:46].
Synergistic Effects and Current Risks
The combination of widespread discontent from popular immiseration (fuel for the fire) and the rise of frustrated elite aspirants (radicals who can ignite the fire) creates a highly volatile situation [00:49:00]. The historical data shows that the size of instability events, measured by fatalities, follows a power law distribution, meaning large outcomes are more likely than often assumed [00:49:33].
The “social pyramid” has become increasingly “top-heavy,” leading to intensified intra-elite competition at all levels [00:52:50]. This can manifest in various ways, from competition among college students for top positions to public spats between billionaires like Elon Musk and Mark Zuckerberg, which can be seen as a modern form of dueling, a historical indicator of elite competition [00:53:27].
Predictability and Triggers
Human social systems are predictable to a degree, particularly concerning structural processes like immiseration and elite overproduction, which evolve slowly [00:57:36]. However, specific triggers that set off an avalanche of violence are essentially unpredictable [00:58:26]. These triggers can include assassinations, geo-economic shocks (like high food prices contributing to the Arab Spring or French Revolution [00:58:40]), or idiosyncratic events [00:58:56].
The escalating rhetoric and secessionist talk in the United States, particularly around elections, are warning signs that could lead to violence [01:00:09]. The trajectory of increasing rhetorical violence often precedes actual violence in historical revolutions and civil wars [01:00:46].
Mitigating Crisis and Seeking Solutions
The current state of the science of history is not yet sufficient to definitively prescribe solutions, but it offers guidance [01:02:19]. The path to crisis is often generalized, but the paths out are diverse [01:02:37].
Historical Lessons
The case of the British Empire during the mid-19th century Chartist period provides insights into both short-term and long-term solutions [01:03:29]. Despite declining real wages and rapid GDP growth that did not “percolate down,” Britain avoided the 1848 revolutions seen in other European states [01:03:40].
- Short-term Solutions: The British Empire had the advantage of shipping millions of surplus workers (e.g., to Australia, North America) and surplus elites (to positions within the empire) [01:04:31]. This reduced labor oversupply and elite competition, buying time [01:05:01].
- Long-term Solutions: The British elites eventually “shut down the wealth pump” [01:05:12]. This included expanding suffrage, giving workers formal power to organize and bargain, and abolishing the “Corn Laws” [01:05:16]. The Corn Laws, which restricted cheap food imports, were a “mini wealth pump” benefiting landlords at the expense of workers; their repeal immediately increased real wages [01:06:08].
Modern Implications
For modern societies, the general guidance is to “shut down the wealth pump” to rebalance the economy and reduce the top-heavy social pyramid [01:06:39]. Specific actions could include increasing the minimum wage [01:07:11]. Historically, high tax rates on top incomes (e.g., over 90% in the US until 1964 [01:09:08]) helped curb the wealth pump [01:08:42].
Another suggestion is to create employment for highly educated but underemployed individuals, such as history PhDs, to reduce their desperation and potential as counter-elites [01:08:07].
The Question of Revolution
A critical debate is whether a revolution could be a “good thing” if the current system is “rotten” [01:09:31]. However, Turchin strongly disagrees, emphasizing the immense human misery and death that accompanies violent revolutions and state collapses [01:10:16]. Having witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union and its aftermath, he notes that violent revolutions often merely exchange one “team of scoundrels” for another [01:11:00].
While some revolutions might have relatively lower costs (e.g., the American Revolution), and some peaceful transitions occur (e.g., England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688 [01:12:21] or the US Progressive Era and New Deal [01:12:52]), these typically occur when people remember the horrors of previous civil conflicts [01:12:33]. The lack of such “memory” today is a significant concern for the future [01:13:13]. The cascade of violence, once initiated, can lead to outcomes far worse than initially imagined [01:13:20].