End Times and Political Disintegration

From: jimruttshow8596

Clio Dynamics, a scientific discipline founded by Peter Turchin, studies the historical dynamics of human societies. Its motivation is twofold: to rigorously apply the scientific method to history, and to understand why large-scale societies, despite their capacity for broadly based well-being, often encounter “end times” periods of social dysfunction, political disintegration, and sometimes outright collapse [00:03:19]. Just as there is a science of human health and environmental health, Turchin argues for a science of social health to understand and prevent societal breakdowns [00:04:17].

Clio Dynamics differs from older theories of history (like the “great man” theory, social forces/structuralism, or environmental determinism) by seeking an integrative science that combines various mechanisms—economic, political, climatological, and even the influence of individuals—and rigorously tests them against data [00:06:30]. Since direct experimentation is impossible in history, the field relies on systematically collected and standardized historical data [00:08:07]. This involves constructing massive databases, such as Seshat (collecting data on polities over 10,000 years) and CrisisDB (focused on societies entering and emerging from crises) [00:15:39].

Drivers of Political Disintegration

Analysis of historical data, particularly from CrisisDB, reveals that periods of internal order and peace in large-scale societies typically end in social dysfunction [00:16:33]. Two ubiquitously observed factors driving these “end times” are popular immiseration and elite overproduction [00:17:01].

Popular Immiseration

Popular immiseration refers to the declining economic well-being of the general population [00:24:32].

• Measurement Proxies:

  • Relative Wage: Calculated as nominal wage divided by GDP per capita in nominal dollars, the relative wage has nearly halved in the United States since 1950 [00:20:53]. This measure accounts for inflation issues and highlights how average workers stopped sharing in general prosperity after the late 1970s [00:22:54]. The gap between worker productivity and compensation, which grew together until the 1970s, represents “extra wealth” that has primarily gone to economic elites [00:22:26].
  • Average Stature: The average height of a population is a reliable proxy for biological well-being [00:11:50]. Studies show that average population height tends to decline in pre-crisis periods, indicating that the population is not faring well [00:12:54]. In the U.S., despite adjustments for ethnic and sex differences, all groups have been negatively affected in the last 20-30 years [00:14:06].

• Impact: When people perceive that their well-being is declining, especially relative to other societal segments or previous generations, it leads to increased discontent and a higher “mass mobilization potential” [00:24:41]. This relative comparison is crucial; people expect their well-being to be greater than that of their parents, a trend that stopped in the U.S. after the late 1970s [00:27:18]. The cost of major items like housing and education has drastically increased relative to wages, making it harder for middle-class aspirations to be met [00:27:51].

Elite Overproduction

Elite overproduction occurs when the number of individuals aspiring to elite positions far exceeds the available positions of power, leading to excessive competition [00:17:11].

• The “Wealth Pump”: The same “wealth pump” that drives popular immiseration by transferring wealth from the poor to the rich also leads to an overproduction of wealthy individuals [00:42:30]. For instance, the number of deca-millionaires (worth $10M+) in the U.S. increased tenfold over 40 years, while the overall population grew by only 40% [00:42:51].
• Political Implications: Many wealthy individuals decide to enter politics, directly as candidates or by funding others [00:43:39]. With a fixed number of political positions (e.g., 100 senatorial positions), this creates an intense “game of musical chairs” where the number of frustrated elite aspirants explodes exponentially [00:44:06].
• Aspirant Elites and Counter-Elites: The drive to escape precarity pushes people to acquire credentials like college and advanced degrees (PhDs, MDs, law degrees) [00:45:13]. However, the market for such positions is often saturated, as seen with lawyers where three times as many are trained as there are suitable positions [00:45:55]. This leads to a bimodal distribution of salaries, with many educated individuals trapped in low-paying jobs and significant debt [00:46:16]. These “frustrated elite aspirants” – intelligent, ambitious, well-educated, and well-connected – become a primary source of potential revolutionaries and radicals, often referred to as “counter-elites” [00:47:06].

Historical Context:

Leaders of past revolutions, such as Lenin, Castro, and Robespierre, were lawyers, demonstrating the propensity of this profession to produce counter-elites [00:47:32]. Counter-elites provide the organization needed to mobilize popular discontent, creating an “explosive mixture” that can lead to revolutions and civil wars [00:48:41].

Predictability and Triggers

Human social systems are predictable to a degree, particularly in their structural trends like immiseration and elite overproduction, which evolve slowly over years or decades [00:57:36]. These trends undermine established societies and build potential energy for conflict [00:55:40].

However, specific triggers that set off an avalanche of violence are essentially unpredictable [00:58:26]. These triggers can include assassinations, geo-economic effects (like soaring food prices, contributing to the Arab Spring and French Revolution), or individual acts of protest [00:58:33]. The exact spark that ignites the “prairie fire” is almost impossible to forecast [00:59:02]. Current rhetoric, with increased violence and calls for secession in the U.S., reflects historical patterns preceding societal breakdown, where language intensifies before spilling into actual violence [01:00:04].

Mitigating End Times

Addressing the risk of societal decline requires both short-term and long-term strategies.

Caution on Solutions:

The science of history is not yet advanced enough to provide definitive answers on how to exit a crisis [01:02:19]. More investment in historical data collection and scientific research is needed [01:03:12].

• Historical Example: 19th Century UK: The British Empire avoided the 1848 Revolutions despite declining real wages and growing popular immiseration [01:03:33].

  • Short-Term Measures: Britain exported millions of surplus workers and surplus elites to its colonies (e.g., Australia, North America), which reduced labor oversupply and elite competition [01:04:28]. This “flattened the curve” and bought time [01:05:01].
  • Long-Term Solutions: The British implemented reforms to “shut down the wealth pump” [01:05:12]. They expanded voting rights, democratizing the political system, and granted formal power to workers to organize and bargain [01:05:16]. They also repealed the Corn Laws, which had favored landlords by artificially inflating food prices, thereby improving workers’ real wages [01:05:31].

• Modern Applications:

  • Long-Term: The general guidance is to “shut down the wealth pump” to rebalance the economy and reduce the “top-heavy” social pyramid [01:06:39]. Historically, periods of high marginal tax rates on top incomes (e.g., 90% in the U.S. until 1964, then 70% until the 1980s) helped counteract this trend [01:08:42].
  • Short-Term: Increasing the minimum wage is one obvious measure that can help, as economists generally agree it does not hurt employment [01:07:11]. Additionally, investing in areas that can absorb frustrated aspirants, such as funding historical research to employ PhDs, could alleviate some social pressure [01:07:55].

The Cost of Revolution

Peter Turchin strongly disagrees with the idea that a violent revolution might be a “good thing” to overthrow a “rotten core” [01:10:16]. He emphasizes the immense human misery and death tolls associated with violent state collapses, drawing from personal experience of the post-Soviet period [01:10:19]. Many violent revolutions merely exchange one group of “scoundrels” for another without improving the situation [01:10:54].

Peaceful Alternatives:

Only 10-15% of historical crises were resolved in a less bloody way [01:11:11]. Examples like the Glorious Revolution in England (1688) or the American New Deal era were influenced by the memory of previous bloody conflicts, leading elites to take steps to avoid worse outcomes [01:12:33]. The lack of recent memory of widespread civil violence in contemporary societies is a significant concern [01:13:13].