From: jimruttshow8596
Clio Dynamics is introduced as a new “science of history” [00:02:16]. This scientific discipline emerged about 25 years ago from Peter Turchin’s background as a theoretical biologist, who shifted from studying animal population dynamics to the historical dynamics of human societies [00:02:31]. At the time, history had not been rigorously submitted to the scientific method, lacking a systematic program for testing theories against data [00:02:55].
A primary motivation for Clio Dynamics is understanding why large-scale societies, despite their capacity for providing widespread well-being, historically run into “end times” characterized by social dysfunction and political disintegration, sometimes leading to outright collapse [00:03:38]. Turchin posits that just as there are sciences for human health and environmental health, there should be a science of social health, given that societal functioning largely determines human well-being [00:04:17].
Clio Dynamics distinguishes itself from previous historical theories (such as the “great man” theory, “social forces/structuralism,” or “environmental determinism”) by being an integrative science [00:05:24]. It considers various mechanisms—economic, political, climatic, and the influence of individuals—and integrates them to understand the dynamics of societies [00:06:33]. The key is to include only processes that matter for understanding and prediction, determined through empirical testing against data, similar to other historical sciences like astrophysics or evolutionary biology [00:07:21].
Drivers of Instability: Popular Immiseration and Elite Overproduction
Turchin identifies two primary drivers for societal instability observed across historical data: popular immiseration and elite overproduction [00:15:04]. These insights come from massive historical databases, such as the Seshat project (collecting data on polities over 10,000 years) and Crisis DB (focusing on polities entering and emerging from crises) [00:15:51]. The data shows that periods of internal order in states typically end with social dysfunction and political disintegration [00:16:40].
Elite Overproduction
Elite overproduction is a ubiquitously observed factor leading to societal instability [00:17:05]. It’s likened to a “game of musical chairs” where the number of “elite aspirants” (players) far exceeds the available “chairs” (positions of power) [00:17:14]. While some competition is healthy, excessive competition among elites becomes disruptive and dysfunctional, leading to the undermining of social norms and political processes, eventually causing political disintegration or civil war [00:17:40].
Turchin notably predicted in 2010 that the United States was likely to slide into heightened political instability around 2020 [00:18:22]. The 2016 Republican primaries, with 17 major candidates vying for a single presidential chair, illustrated this dynamic, leading to broken rules and chaotic processes [00:18:42].
Popular Immiseration
Popular immiseration refers to the declining well-being of the general population. Turchin uses “relative wage” (nominal wage divided by nominal GDP per capita) as a key indicator, arguing it avoids issues with inflation calculations and better reflects how wealth is distributed [00:20:53]. In the U.S., the relative wage has nearly halved since the 19th century [00:19:34].
This decline is linked to what Turchin calls the “wealth pump,” a “perverse wealth pump that takes from the poor and gives it to the rich” [00:22:41]. This is evident in the divergence between worker productivity and compensation, which grew together until the late 1970s before compensation stagnated [00:22:09]. This extra wealth, instead of being shared, increasingly flowed to economic elites [00:23:01].
Historical examples include:
- Medieval Europe: Population growth led to overpopulation, depressing wages and increasing rents, directing more GDP to elites [00:23:22].
- Modern U.S. While mechanisms differ, the overall pattern is similar: ruling elites, accustomed to stability, reconfigure the economy for their benefit [00:23:58].
The consequences of popular immiseration include:
- Increased discontent among the population [00:24:41].
- Rise of “mass mobilization potential,” as discontented people can be mobilized by political entrepreneurs for rebellions and political action [00:24:54].
People’s expectations of well-being are relative, not absolute, comparing themselves to other segments of the population (e.g., the top 1%) and to previous generations [00:25:50]. Until the late 1970s, each American generation saw their well-being increase compared to their parents; this trend has since reversed [00:27:22]. The cost of major life items like housing and education has risen disproportionately for median workers [00:27:51]. For example, a median worker now needs to work 40% more to afford a house compared to 40 years ago [00:28:04], and working-class parents have to work nearly four times as long to send a child to college than in the 1970s [00:28:34].
The “social pyramid” has become “top-heavy” and “steeper” [00:30:00]. The compensation gap between CEOs and average workers has vastly increased (e.g., 15x in 1965 to 236x in 2021), and similar trends are seen in sports and entertainment [00:30:01]. This steepening pyramid intensifies the desire to ascend it, while the number of “chairs” (elite positions) may be contracting due to factors like automation and outsourcing [00:33:40].
Failed Aspirant Elites (Counter-Elites)
A critical consequence of elite overproduction and popular immiseration is the emergence of “failed aspirant elites” or “counter-elites” [00:41:05]. These are intelligent, ambitious, well-educated individuals who cannot secure a suitable position in society commensurate with their perceived capacity [00:41:06]. This frustration is “very dangerous” as it “undermines the stability of societies” [00:42:15].
The “wealth pump” contributes to this by:
- Overproduction of Wealthy People: The number of deca-millionaires in the U.S. has increased tenfold in 40 years, while the overall population only grew by 40% [00:42:54]. A growing number of these wealthy individuals enter politics, or support other candidates, intensifying competition for elite positions [00:43:39].
- Push for Credentials: To escape precarity, people seek credentials, leading to an oversupply of advanced degree holders (e.g., lawyers), many of whom cannot find jobs commensurate with their qualifications or debt [00:45:13]. For example, the U.S. now trains three times as many lawyers as there are positions, leading to a bimodal salary distribution where many are “trapped” with low wages and significant debt [00:46:01].
These frustrated aspirant elites are described as intelligent, ambitious, well-educated, and well-connected, with a huge incentive to “get ahead of the game” [00:47:06]. They become the “primary source of potential revolutionaries and radicals” [00:47:27], providing the organization needed to channel mass discontent into action [00:48:41]. Historical examples include Lenin, Castro, and Robespierre, all of whom were lawyers [00:47:32]. In the U.S., Yale Law School, for instance, produces both established elites and counter-elites, such as Stewart Rhodes of Oath Keepers [00:47:55].
Synergistic Dynamics and Risks
The combination of popular immiseration (the “fuel”) and frustrated aspirant elites (the “radicals” who “ignite the fire”) creates an “explosive mixture” for societal breakdown [00:48:55].
This is further exacerbated by intensifying intra-elite competition at all levels of the social pyramid [00:52:50]. Historically, increased dueling among elites, as seen in the 17th and mid-19th centuries, signals heightened competition that can become bloody [00:53:40].
While the structural trends that undermine societies are predictable and build up “potential energy” [00:55:40], specific triggers for avalanches of violence are largely unpredictable [00:58:31]. These triggers can range from assassinations of rulers to geo-economic effects (like high food prices contributing to the Arab Spring and French Revolution) [00:58:33]. The 2024 U.S. elections are a potential trigger, with the risk of non-acceptance of results and intensified rhetoric leading to violence [00:59:39].
Paths Forward and Avoiding Violent Collapse
Turchin acknowledges that the science is not yet good enough to offer definitive solutions [01:02:19]. However, he emphasizes the need for significant investment in building the science of Clio Dynamics and collecting more data to characterize paths out of crises [01:02:52].
Historical examples offer insights:
- 19th Century British Empire: Avoided the 1848 revolutions despite dire conditions by implementing short-term and long-term solutions [01:03:33]. Short-term, they shipped surplus workers and elites to the British Empire, reducing oversupply and reversing wage decline [01:04:25]. Long-term, they “shut down the wealth pump” by expanding voting rights for workers, giving them formal bargaining power, and abolishing the “Corn Laws” (which had artificially inflated food prices for landowners’ benefit), which immediately boosted real wages [01:05:10].
For the modern U.S., the general guidance is to “shut down the wealth pump” to rebalance the economy and reduce the top-heaviness of the social pyramid [01:06:39]. Short-term actions could include increasing the minimum wage [01:07:01] and potentially employing excess credentialed individuals in public works, like historical data collection, to reduce their desperation and remove “potential counter elites” [01:07:46].
Turchin strongly disagrees with the notion that a revolution is a good thing, citing the immense human misery of violent state collapses [01:10:16]. His experience growing up in the Soviet Union and witnessing its collapse in the 1990s showed him “a huge amount of misery” and subsequent civil wars [01:10:28]. Furthermore, many violent revolutions simply exchange one “team of scoundrels” for another [01:11:00]. While “peaceful revolutions” that lead to necessary reforms are desirable, violence itself is both inherently bad and often counterproductive [01:11:24].
The “Glorious Revolution” in England (1688) is cited as an example of a relatively low-cost transition from absolute to constitutional monarchy, largely because participants remembered the horrors of the English Civil War and took steps to avoid similar bloodshed [01:12:17]. Similarly, the reforms of the U.S. Progressive Era and New Deal were influenced by the memory of the American Civil War [01:12:51]. The current lack of such recent historical memory of widespread violence in the U.S. makes the present situation particularly worrying [01:13:13].