From: jameskerlindsay
Turkey appears to be on the brink of a major military offensive against Syria’s Kurds, with reports of increased troop movements along the border and heightened activity by Turkish proxy forces in Syria [00:00:00]. This suggests the possibility of a full-scale assault on Kurdish-held territories is imminent [00:00:12].
Historical Context of Turkey-Kurdish Relations
The relationship between Turkey and the Kurds is long and complex [00:01:30]. In international relations, irredentism refers to a state’s or group’s efforts to reclaim territories considered part of its historical or cultural homeland, often involving those with shared ethnic, linguistic, or religious ties [00:00:37]. For over four decades, the Turkish government has actively opposed Kurdish efforts to establish a homeland within Turkey or on its borders [00:01:08].
Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, plans were drafted to divide the Anatolian Peninsula, which included the possibility of creating a Kurdish homeland [00:01:39]. However, these plans were thwarted by Turkish nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk [00:01:52]. With the emergence of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, hopes for a Kurdish state diminished, leaving Kurds divided among five countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Armenia [00:02:01].
For decades, Kurdish hopes for independence remained distant, with uprisings in various countries being heavily resisted [00:02:19]. A significant new insurgency emerged in Turkey in 1984 when the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) launched a campaign for Kurdish independence, initially from the rural Kurdish southeast, which then expanded into Turkish towns and cities [00:02:32].
The issue gained a broader regional dimension in the early 1990s with the establishment of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq after the First Gulf War [00:02:51]. This raised Turkish fears of an eventual Kurdish state and allowed the PKK to use the mountainous areas of Iraq as bases for attacks on Turkey [00:03:03]. Despite the arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 and sporadic peace efforts, Turkey has remained highly concerned about Kurdish aspirations for statehood, both within its borders and in neighboring countries, fearing it could fuel further separatism [00:03:15].
Syrian Civil War and Kurdish Self-Rule
The Arab Spring in 2011 led to widespread protests across the Middle East, escalating into a brutal civil war in Syria [00:03:55]. As Bashar al-Assad’s forces battled opposition in the south, Kurdish groups in northern Syria, primarily led by the PYD and its armed wing, the YPG, seized the opportunity to establish self-rule, eventually declaring the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria [00:04:06].
Turkey viewed this development as a significant threat due to the PYD’s ties to the PKK [00:04:24]. Despite Ankara’s concerns, its ability to limit Kurdish autonomy was hampered by the rise of ISIS, which led key Western countries, including the United States, to support the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in combating the Islamic State [00:04:32]. Although Turkey conducted several operations against the Kurds during this period, they were relatively limited [00:04:51].
By 2019, with ISIS largely defeated, the Trump administration announced the withdrawal of US troops from northern Syria following talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan [00:04:58]. Turkey then invaded [00:05:16].
Operation Peace Spring (2019)
Known as Operation Peace Spring, this mission served two main objectives [00:05:19]:
- Establishing a “safe zone” for the repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees living in Turkey [00:05:24].
- Diminishing Kurdish control in northern and northeastern Syria [00:05:31].
The operation had wider ramifications [00:05:38]:
- It forced the SDF to seek support from Russia and the Assad regime, thus bolstering their power in Syria [00:05:41].
- It led to a resurgence of ISIS, as Kurdish forces were distracted, allowing Islamist militants to escape [00:05:49].
Following significant international diplomatic pressure and threats of sanctions, Turkey agreed to a ceasefire and withdrew its forces to a 115-kilometer-long strip of Syrian territory along its border [00:05:58].
Ongoing Pressure and Imminent Threat
Despite the ceasefire, Turkey has maintained pressure on the Kurds, regularly signaling the possibility of another full-scale invasion [00:06:14]. Speculation intensified in late 2022 after a bomb attack in Istanbul was linked to the YPG, leading many observers to believe Turkey was waiting for the opportune moment to act [00:06:21].
The recent fall of the Assad regime appears to have opened the way for a Turkish invasion [00:06:39]. With Russia potentially less influential and the new HTS administration in Damascus supported by pro-Turkish forces, Ankara may perceive this as an ideal time to act against the Kurds [00:06:46]. Reports already indicate that Turkey and its allied proxies are preparing a major assault on Kurdish-held areas in northern and eastern Syria [00:07:00].
Challenges for Kurdish Forces
An invasion would pose a massive threat to Kurdish areas [00:07:11]. While the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are battle-hardened from fighting ISIS, they are stretched thin across a large area [00:07:17]. Turkey possesses superior air power and more artillery, in addition to support from its Syrian proxy forces [00:07:26]. While Kurdish forces could mount stiff resistance in certain areas, they would almost certainly require external assistance [00:07:34].
Potential External Support
The question remains: where would the Kurds find help?
United States and Western Countries
Attention first turns to Western countries, particularly the United States [00:07:46]. However, Washington faces a delicate balancing act [00:07:52]. While the US has supported the Kurdish-led SDF against ISIS, Turkey is a NATO ally [00:07:58]. Historically, the US has avoided such confrontations with Ankara, making it highly doubtful that it would militarily assist Kurdish areas against a Turkish attack [00:08:06]. The US response would likely focus on de-escalation, diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and calls for restraint [00:08:18]. Similarly, few European countries would be willing or able to engage [00:08:35].
Israel
A second possibility raised is Israel providing support, perhaps through air cover [00:08:46]. While Israel has historically sympathized with the Kurds, viewing them as a counterbalance to shared adversaries like Iran, Syria, and Islamist groups, and has often voiced support for Kurdish aspirations, direct military assistance is unlikely if Turkey attacks [00:08:57]. Such a move risks a direct military confrontation with Turkey, which could escalate unpredictably, and would strain relations with allies like the United States [00:09:15]. Any Israeli assistance would likely be focused and carefully calibrated to avoid a broader conflict, such as intelligence sharing [00:09:29].
Iraqi Kurds
The only other likely source of support would be the Iraqi Kurds [00:09:42]. Although Kurdish populations share ethnic and cultural ties, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has been weakened in recent years and is on the verge of financial collapse [00:09:49]. Moreover, the KRG maintains a complex relationship with Turkey, and supporting Syrian Kurds, particularly the YPG (linked to the PKK), could jeopardize these ties [00:10:02]. Therefore, while Iraqi Kurds might provide humanitarian assistance, significant military support to Syria’s Kurds seems unlikely [00:10:13].
Outlook
For all these reasons, Ankara may calculate that now is the ideal moment to strike against the Kurds [00:10:24]. While Turkey might still back off under sustained international pressure [00:10:31], a full-scale invasion, based on past experiences where hundreds of thousands were killed, injured, and displaced, would almost certainly lead to a brutal conflict with many casualties [00:10:37]. The new post-Assad era in Syria, far from ending the fighting, may see the country enter a new and bloodier phase [00:10:49].