From: allin
The Tucker Carlson interview with Russian President Vladimir Putin was released shortly after a recent podcast taping, leading to a retrospective discussion on its content and implications [01:31:47].
Interview Assessment and Dynamics
The interview was given a “B” grade, suggesting it could have been better but was “not bad” overall [01:31:55]. It was noted that no journalist is likely to trap Putin or extract significant new information from him [01:32:03].
Tucker Carlson’s Approach
Tucker Carlson was perceived as sympathetic to Russia, holding the belief that the West had forced Putin to invade Ukraine [01:32:11]. Out of 43 questions, approximately 15 were considered “softballs” and only about six were “fastballs” [01:32:28]. Carlson reportedly lost control of the interview early on [01:32:36]. Similar to previous interviews with Putin, he largely engaged in “spinning and pontificating,” avoiding difficult questions [01:33:11].
Geopolitical Insights and Takeaways
Putin’s Portrayal
One significant takeaway was that Putin did not come across as a “crazy madman” [01:33:54]. Instead, he appeared as a “methodical thinker” with a deep understanding of historical contexts spanning thousands of years, which informs his decisions [01:34:00]. This portrayal made it challenging to view him as irrational [01:34:28].
The NATO Question
A pivotal moment highlighted was Putin’s claim that in 1999, he asked then-President Bill Clinton if Russia could join NATO [01:34:41]. According to Putin, Clinton initially responded positively but later retracted, stating his team had said no [01:34:57]. This rebuff is suggested to explain much of Russia’s subsequent actions [01:35:36].
While some argued this was a theoretical discussion, others asserted that Putin’s offer to join NATO was a well-known historical fact [01:38:43]. In 1999, the justification for NATO’s existence was at its weakest, making a potential Russian entry akin to dismantling the alliance [01:36:55].
Historical Warnings and US Policy
During his initial rise to power, Putin sought cordial relations with the U.S. and its presidents but was consistently rebuffed [01:38:57]. The U.S. also reneged on a promise to Mikhail Gorbachev not to expand NATO eastward, leading to multiple waves of expansion [01:39:09].
Warnings from American diplomats underscored the potential negative ramifications of these policies:
- George Kennan (1990s): The architect of the Cold War containment doctrine, Kennan stated that NATO expansion would be “the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era” [01:39:48]. He predicted it would inflame nationalist, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russia, negatively impact Russian democracy, and restore a Cold War atmosphere [01:40:08].
- Bill Burns (2008): Then-ambassador to Moscow, Burns warned Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice that NATO expansion into Ukraine was “the brightest of all red lines for the entire Russian Elite,” not just Putin [01:40:43].
Despite these warnings, the U.S. persisted in its policy of pressure, supporting actions like the Maidan in 2014, attempting to expand NATO into Russia’s vulnerable borders, and supporting “hard right ultranationalist Neo-Nazi elements” in Ukraine [01:41:17].
The overall conclusion drawn was that Putin is a rational actor with whom negotiations could have occurred [01:41:37]. There was an opportunity to prevent the current conflict by taking NATO expansion off the table, which was refused [01:41:46]. Even after the interview, the Biden administration reportedly rejected negotiations despite Putin offering an “olive branch” [01:41:58]. This approach has been described as turning a potential ally into an enemy, fulfilling Kennan’s prediction [01:42:16].
For more context on the political figures and dynamics, refer to: