Military Strategy and Stockpiles

From: jimruttshow8596
The Ukraine-Russia War has offered significant lessons in military strategy and the utility of existing stockpiles, challenging long-held assumptions about modern warfare [00:01:29].

Obsolete Stockpiles and Rapid Technological Transformation

Traditional military stockpiles are proving far less useful than previously assumed [00:02:41]. This is due to two main reasons:

1. High Attrition Rate: The rate of attrition in drone-intensified warfare is extremely high for equipment ranging from tanks and trucks to artillery shells [00:02:51]. Artillery has returned as a key component of positional warfare, demanding immense quantities of shells that are difficult to stockpile [00:03:05].
2. Technological Obsolescence: The next conflict will be waged with even more advanced technological tools, making it difficult to know what to stockpile in advance [00:03:17]. For instance, stockpiles of old tanks are obsolete [00:03:31]. Ukraine now produces 80,000 suicide drones monthly, a scaling of production considered impossible just a few years ago [00:03:42].

Decision-makers globally are downplaying this profound transformation, possibly because they do not wish to inform large military contractors that their product lines are obsolete [00:03:57]. The rapid evolution of warfare technology means that envisioning future needs beyond two years is becoming increasingly difficult [00:04:41].

Peer-to-Peer vs. Asymmetric Warfare

The Ukraine-Russia War marks the first major near-peer conflict since World War II [00:05:09]. Previous conflicts often involved a technologically superior force fighting a less sophisticated opponent [00:05:01]. This peer-level dynamic has exposed weaknesses in “lazy assumptions” made by stronger powers [00:05:43]. For example, Russia’s ability to jam GPS signals rendered many US-made GPS-guided munitions, like HIMARS rockets, largely ineffective [00:06:03].

Miscalculations in the Russian Invasion

Four main factors contributed to Russian miscalculations in the initial invasion:

1. Failure to Decapitate Leadership: Russia gambled that Ukraine’s leadership would flee, similar to the collapse of the Afghanistan government [00:07:44]. This expectation was wrong, as President Zelenskyy remained [00:08:25].
2. Overestimation of Mobile Warfare: Both Russia and many international observers overestimated the effectiveness of mobile warfare, particularly tank warfare, in modern conflict [00:09:16]. The terrain in Ukraine, historically suitable for large tank battles (e.g., Battle of Kursk), saw an initial Russian push that eventually gave way to a technological transformation favoring positional warfare [00:09:27] [00:11:04].
3. Ukrainian Readiness: Ukraine had extensively reformed and swept its government for Russian sympathizers since 2014, and its military had undergone significant training and modernization [00:17:11]. Additionally, the harsh reality of Russian rule in areas like Donbas turned many ethnic Russians against the Russian cause [00:17:51].
4. Russian Military Corruption: The level of corruption within the Russian military was much higher than anticipated [00:19:12]. Reforms initiated in the early 2000s to streamline and modernize the military were largely ineffective [00:19:17]. This led to significant supply shortages, such as cheap tires replacing military-grade ones, causing logistical breakdowns [00:20:41]. Russia’s initial advance stalled not due to a Ukrainian counter-offensive, but because they exhausted their own supplies [00:20:00].

The Pendulum of Offensive vs. Defensive Dominance

Military history shows a recurring shift between offensive and defensive dominance, often driven by technology [00:11:19].

• Napoleonic Era to US Civil War: Smoothbore muskets (75-yard effective range) favored frontal assaults [00:11:37]. The invention of the Minié ball and rifled muskets (200-yard effective range) in the mid-19th century drastically shifted the advantage to the tactical defensive [00:12:30].
• World War I: Machine guns and rapid-fire light artillery made breakthroughs exceedingly difficult on compact fronts, leading to static trench warfare [00:14:13].
• World War II: The combination of air power, radio, and tanks led to a return of mobile warfare (Blitzkrieg), with front lines moving significantly faster than in WWI [00:14:37].
• Modern Warfare: The Ukraine-Russia War indicates a new shift. Inexpensive anti-tank weapons and drones have made traditional mobile warfare (e.g., tank advances) less effective, returning some advantage to the defense [00:15:26].

The Role of Reserves and Conscription

Ukraine’s ability to ramp up its military from 200,000 to 700,000 personnel by July 2022 highlights the importance of a massive reserve force in a peer-to-peer conflict [00:21:40]. The US military’s reserve forces are significantly smaller in absolute numbers than Ukraine’s, raising questions about US readiness for an extended multi-year war [00:22:51].

The war has also re-emphasized the role of conscription. While professionalized militaries in the 1990s and early 2000s led many countries to abolish mandatory military service, Ukraine’s defense depended on its capability to institute a wide draft [00:25:27]. This may lead to more mandatory service globally, especially in Europe and Asia [00:26:28].

Demographic Impact on Warfare

The average age of combatants in the Ukraine-Russia War (40.5 for Ukraine, 40.7 for Russia) is notably higher than in previous historical conflicts [00:28:48]. This demographic decline in both countries, common in many modern nations, could lead to wars where older individuals are increasingly involved and casualties [00:29:07].

The Evolution of Drone Warfare

The war has seen an incredibly rapid evolution in drone warfare [00:35:05].

• Off-the-shelf Components: Militarily useful drones can be built from civilian electronics with explosives [00:35:15].
• Skilled Pilots: Drone pilot skill is a significant factor, with virtual reality goggles enabling thousands of hours of combat flight experience with minimal risk to the pilot’s life [00:36:08]. This allows pilots to become exceptionally skilled, similar to snipers [00:36:44]. Young people, with faster response times and higher neuroplasticity, may be optimally suited for drone piloting [00:37:15].
• Obsoleting Traditional Air Forces: The muted role of both Ukrainian and Russian traditional air forces suggests drones are becoming the new air power for reconnaissance and munition delivery [00:42:08]. This poses a challenge for countries like the US, which heavily invested in manned, 20th-century air forces [00:42:58].
• Cost Ratios and Industrial Transformation: The low cost of suicide drones ($1,000 or less) compared to a Russian tank (millions) creates a highly favorable economic exchange ratio [00:46:13]. This means countries must build their own drones to adapt rapidly to combat conditions [00:40:32], leading to the industrialization of drone production [00:41:05].

Autonomous Drones

The development of truly autonomous drones is expected to be incremental, similar to self-driving cars, due to the long tail of complex, unstructured battlefield situations and limited unique combat data sets for training AI [00:50:11] [00:52:58]. However, the arms race in electronic countermeasures (ECM) makes remote piloting increasingly difficult, potentially accelerating the need for autonomous capabilities [00:53:43]. The lower bar for “good enough” performance in warfare (where some civilian casualties or friendly fire are accepted) could also push autonomous development faster [00:55:08].

The Continued Relevance of Artillery

Despite advances in drone warfare, artillery remains the “queen of battle” [00:44:47]. Millions of artillery shells have been expended in the Ukraine-Russia War [00:05:14].

• Dumb Drones: Artillery shells are effective “dumb drones” that cannot be easily jammed by ECM once fired [01:06:16].
• Positional Warfare: The return to positional warfare and trench warfare, partly due to drones making maneuver difficult, has amplified artillery’s advantage [01:06:51].
• Drone-Artillery Synergy: Surveillance drones can provide live targeting updates for artillery pieces, creating a powerful pairing [01:07:33].
• Logistical Challenges: Ukraine’s reliance on Soviet-caliber artillery and subsequent transition to NATO-caliber equipment has strained Western stockpiles, highlighting the need for increased production of basic supplies [01:08:00] [01:08:40].

Implications for Future Conflicts: The Straits of Taiwan

Lessons from the Ukraine-Russia War have significant implications for a potential conflict over the Straits of Taiwan:

• Sanctions Effectiveness: Countries now understand that US-led sanctions only matter if China also sanctions them [01:13:11], giving some nations flexibility in balancing US and Chinese interests.
• Untested Military: The Chinese military (PLA) is largely untested in large-scale combat [01:13:55]. Its bureaucratic functionality and logistical capabilities are likely problematic, similar to Russia’s [01:15:02]. China might attempt smaller expeditionary conflicts to test its forces before a Taiwan invasion [01:14:01].
• Autocratic Regimes and Public Opinion: Autocratic countries can effectively rally their populations for aggressive wars [01:16:35]. Theories that internal dissent would overthrow leaders like Putin during war proved false [01:16:52].
• Drone Swarms for Invasion: The massive number of drones used in Ukraine suggests a potential for a “300,000 drone” invasion across the Taiwan Strait, overwhelming air defenses and allowing for psychological operations (e.g., declaring curfews via loudspeakers) [01:17:41]. This highlights a qualitative shift in amphibious invasion scenarios [01:19:00].
• Defensive Advantage and Naval Obscurity: The war’s macro-level favoring of the defensive makes a full-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan highly risky for China [01:22:12]. Ukraine’s ability to drive the Russian Navy out of the Black Sea using inexpensive anti-ship missiles demonstrates the vulnerability of traditional naval assets like aircraft carriers [01:22:55] [01:23:08].
• Autonomous Submersibles: The development of autonomous submersible vehicles could lead to new blockade strategies, with thousands of self-deploying “attack mines” surrounding an island [01:25:40]. This would spark another arms race in undersea warfare [01:26:11].