From: jimruttshow8596
Introspection and the Philosophy of Mind
Introspection, the examination of one’s own conscious thoughts and feelings, is presented as an important tool in philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology . Despite its potential, there is currently no established methodology for introspection in these fields . However, it is an important tool in various meditation schools .
Introspection in Cognitive Models
Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace Theory is noted as a cognitive model that partially originates from intuitions gained through introspection . Baars’ theory suggests that the “sensorium” or “movie” of our conscious experience is broadcast to wide areas of the brain, allowing various functional areas to process that information . From the speaker’s perspective, the core feature of consciousness is the ability to remember what was paid attention to, implying that information, initially distributed, must be integrated into a “common protocol” that can be accessed later, thus localizing it . This concept aligns with the gaining prominence of “attention” in machine learning .
Daniel Dennett and Phenomenal Experience
Philosopher Daniel Dennett is discussed in relation to his rejection of philosophical zombies and the “hard problem” of consciousness . Dennett defines “functionalism” as treating a phenomenon as a result of its implementation, meaning that if an entity fulfills all functional and causal properties, it doesn’t make sense to deny its “essence” . For example, a “zombank” would be indistinguishable from a bank in function but supposedly lack “true bankness,” a notion Dennett rejects as nonsensical, applying the same logic to consciousness .
A critique of Dennett’s stance suggests that he seems to “miss the problem that people try to explain,” particularly the importance of “phenomenal experience” . This perceived oversight might stem from Dennett’s highly conceptual and analytical mindset, common among scientists who may prioritize ideas over feelings and intuitions . This “nerd” mindset, where individuals learn to trust rational models over feelings due to social interaction difficulties, can lead to a deficiency in intuitive empathy . While this focus on analytical truths is useful for science, it is argued that it is not viable for everyday life, where intuitions often suffice where logic would fail .
The “Hard Problem” and Reality as Representation
Regarding David Chalmers’ “hard problem” of consciousness, the discussion pivots to the idea that the task might not be to explain how a physical system has conscious experience, but rather why people think they have conscious experience—explaining the “psychological certainty” . This leads to the concept that our perceived reality is not the physical world itself (which lacks colors, sounds, or feelings) but rather a “dream” or “representation” generated by the brain .
To have an enlightened relationship with reality, it is considered necessary to realize that what we perceive, including our self and our relationship to the universe, is a representation, not an immediate reality . This requires paying attention to the attentional system itself, making its construction of reality visible . People who are naturally in altered states of mind or facing existential crises often become familiar with these processes of reality construction, as their normal functioning breaks down .
The “realness” of experience is not an attribute of physical reality itself but a “model property”—a label the mind attaches to certain parameter dimensions that are predictive of future sensory patterns . This means that experiences are considered “real” because they are predictive of subsequent experiential features .