From: jimruttshow8596
The discussion between Jim Rutt and Joshua Bach delves into differing philosophical approaches to the mind, particularly contrasting Functionalism with Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as explanations for how mind emerges from matter [01:12:57].
Functionalism
Functionalism posits that a phenomenon is understood and defined by its function or how it operates, rather than its physical composition [00:39:11]. Joshua Bach defines mind as “essentially the software that runs on the brain” [01:49:50]. He further elaborates that software is not a physical “thing” with an identity, but rather a “very specific physical law” that describes what happens when components are arranged in a particular way, creating a causal structure [02:05:05].
Key aspects of Functionalism:
- Substrate Independence: If a system can implement the same principles and functional constraints as a brain, it can host a mind, regardless of its physical substrate [03:15:00]. This means a mind could theoretically arise from an artificial brain [01:27:00].
- Embodiment: While the human mind is strongly embedded in its bodily substrate, Functionalism argues that embodiment can be “entirely virtual” [04:27:00]. As long as the system has “human similar affordances,” it can result in a human-like mind [04:47:00].
- Rejection of “Hidden Essence”: Functionalism rejects the idea of a “true bankness” or a hidden essence of something that lacks observable causal properties [04:10:00]. All causal properties can ultimately be explained as functions that are computable and physically realizable [04:47:00]. This stance directly addresses and rejects the notion of philosophical zombies [03:51:00].
Integrated Information Theory (IIT)
Integrated Information Theory, primarily developed by Giulio Tononi, proposes that consciousness corresponds to a system’s capacity to integrate information [01:46:00].
Key aspects of IIT:
- Quantifiable Measure (Phi): IIT attempts to quantify consciousness using a measure called “phi” [03:03:00].
- Opposition to Functionalism: Joshua Bach notes that the IIT community is “mostly opposed to functionalism” [03:20:00] and seeks an alternative explanation [03:26:00].
- Panpsychism: Bach suggests that a core motivation behind Tononi’s theory is to find a way to explain or reintroduce panpsychism [03:14:00].
- Physics Community Interest: The adoption of IIT by some physicists, like Max Tegmark, is viewed by Bach as potentially “a little bit political,” aimed at integrating various aspects of the universe [03:32:00].
Contrasting Perspectives
Joshua Bach offers several criticisms and observations regarding IIT:
- Internal Disagreement: Bach likens IIT workshops to “climate denialist conference[s]” due to significant internal disagreements among proponents on how to compute phi, its status, and its relevance [03:08:00]. He states there is “much more disagreement between them than there is disagreement that they basically have with the mainstream” [03:46:00].
- Ironic Stance: He finds it ironic that IIT, an information theoretic theory, is anti-functionalist, given that Functionalism and information theory are “strongly intertwined” [03:52:00].
- Reliance on Quantifiable Statements: The introduction of “phi” is seen as a way to “produce a theory with quantifiable statements that can be mapped to experimental predictions” [03:57:00], which is the “gold standard in the sciences but not in philosophy” [03:57:00].
- Lack of Functional Sense: Early in the conversation, Bach expresses difficulty understanding how frequency-based theories of consciousness (like those adopted by Christof Koch, a supporter of IIT) make “functional sense” or explain the necessary and sufficient conditions for consciousness [01:42:00]. He suggests that brain oscillations are a result of synchronization for consciousness, not its cause [01:13:00].
Related Philosophical Problems
The discussion also touches upon related philosophical problems concerning mind and reality:
- Philosophical Zombies: Daniel Dennett’s rejection of philosophical zombies (systems identical in all features but lacking phenomenal experience) aligns with Functionalism, as there’s no essence beyond observable functional properties [03:51:00].
- The Hard Problem of Consciousness: David Chalmers’ “hard problem” of consciousness—explaining how physical systems give rise to subjective experience—is addressed. Bach notes that Chalmers’ current philosophy often focuses on explaining why people think there is a hard problem rather than solving the phenomenon itself [05:01:00].
- Nature of Reality: Bach proposes that “physical reality doesn’t feel like anything” [09:14:00]; feelings and the experience of “realness” are properties of the mind’s internal models, not of physics directly [09:19:00]. We don’t experience actual reality, but rather “an interpretation of reality” and “meaning maps” [01:04:55].
- Panpsychism/Psy Phenomena: The conversation briefly explores psy-phenomena (e.g., telepathy, clairvoyance) and the question of whether the universe is purely mechanical or allows for “magical interactions” [01:02:05]. If psy is real, it would challenge the idea of a causally closed mechanical universe [05:17:00]. However, the lack of reliable evidence, such as people consistently winning lotteries, suggests that such phenomena might be better explained by retroactive changes in memory rather than actual foresight [05:38:00].
Ultimately, while both functionalism and IIT seek to explain the emergence of mind, they diverge significantly in their foundational assumptions and methodologies, with Bach favoring a functionalist, computational perspective while critiquing IIT’s theoretical and empirical basis.