From: jimruttshow8596
The COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 exposed significant challenges in modern governance, particularly concerning the speed and effectiveness of vaccine rollout and the underlying regulatory approval processes [00:54:50]. These issues highlight systemic problems within bureaucratic institutions and their ability to respond to large-scale crises [00:50:55].
Slowed Vaccine Approval Process
While the scientific community rapidly developed effective vaccines, the approval process, particularly by the FDA, significantly delayed their widespread availability [00:31:27]. Despite being about “10 times faster than usual,” the process was still deemed excessively long given the urgency of the pandemic [00:31:40].
A radical proposal suggested releasing all available vaccines quickly and recalling those with disproportionate side effects, prioritizing rapid deployment over lengthy pre-market validation [00:32:08]. This contrasts sharply with the actual regulatory approach.
Bureaucratic Inertia and Conflict of Interest
The slow pace is attributed to the inherent nature of bureaucracies, where the primary loyalty is to the institution and its internal processes, rather than to external results [00:21:07]. This creates a “conflict of interest” within institutions like the FDA [00:39:07].
Instead of optimizing for sense-making and quality decisions, the focus becomes bolstering the institution’s reputation and strength [00:20:51].
“Their interest is in retaining their prestige and so anything that damages their prestige like we gave this vaccine to people and harmed them is much weighs much more heavily on their minds than um you know this oh we just we’re just going to let people die even though we have a vaccine” [00:39:25]
This prioritization stems from a historical aversion to “positive mistakes” (action with negative consequences), such as the Swine Flu panic of 1976 [00:36:26]. In 1976, an overly rushed vaccine campaign for a flu that wasn’t a major threat resulted in hundreds developing Guillain-Barré syndrome [00:37:06]. This event created a strong internal bias within regulatory bodies to avoid any action that could be perceived as harmful, even if inaction leads to far greater harm [00:37:28].
This perspective is described as applying the “Hippocratic Oath” (“above all, do no harm”) not to the patient’s immediate health, but to the institution’s reputational safety [00:41:17].
Lack of Accountability
Despite significant mistakes made by regulatory bodies like the CDC and FDA in early 2020, there was little to no accountability or job loss for those responsible [01:04:09]. This contrasts with private sector “monarchical governance,” where leaders are held accountable for results and replaced if performance is bad [01:03:38].
Government Incompetence and State Capacity
The overall vaccine rollout highlighted a broader issue of governmental incompetence and a lack of “state capacity” in Western nations, particularly the United States [00:47:45].
The “Stupidity Quotient” (SQ) Lens
The “Stupidity Quotient” (SQ) is a conceptual tool used to evaluate the effectiveness of decisions by comparing them to what a child would reasonably conclude [00:18:12]. Applying this lens to the pandemic response:
- Travel Restrictions: A child, asked if airplanes should keep flying internationally with a dangerous disease, would instinctively say “no” [00:19:24]. Yet, the U.S. government delayed restrictions to avoid disrupting travel and trade [00:19:56].
- Vaccine Risk vs. Benefit: When comparing 400 people getting sick from a vaccine (as in Swine Flu) to 300,000 dying from COVID-19, a child would easily identify the latter as the greater tragedy [00:38:15]. However, bureaucratic incentives prioritized avoiding the former risk to institutional prestige [00:39:36].
This demonstrates a disconnect between the apparent rational choices and the actual decisions made by governing institutions [00:20:24].
Failure of “Hammer and Dance” Strategy
Early in the pandemic, the “hammer and the dance” strategy was proposed, advocating for an aggressive initial crackdown (hammer) followed by targeted interventions (dance) [00:48:30]. This strategy, effective in countries like Taiwan, failed in the U.S. because the government lacked the fundamental “state capacity” to implement it [00:49:50].
- Testing and Tracing: The U.S. government lacks basic capabilities for counting and tracking its citizens, making aggressive test-trace-isolate strategies impossible [00:50:11]. Unlike China, which implemented proactive testing and quarantine facilities to control the disease, Western nations could not [00:45:31].
- Digital Infrastructure: The U.S. digital infrastructure for citizenship is compared to a “shambles,” unable to support sophisticated public health measures [00:51:31].
This inability to “dance” after the initial “hammer” led to a prolonged “permanent war mentality” against the virus, where the goal shifted from eradication to merely “controlling” it, without a clear path to winning [00:54:10].
Historical Comparison of Governance
The contrast between modern government effectiveness and historical successes like the Manhattan Project suggests a fundamental shift in the nature of governance [00:55:07].
- Manhattan Project: This highly successful, large-scale engineering project was run like a “startup,” with a top-down, “monarchical governance” structure and clear accountability [00:56:14]. Researchers were directed to work on specific problems, unlike the modern grant-based, “hobby horse” approach [00:56:29].
- Modern Governance (Oligarchical): Today’s scientific endeavors and government departments, such as the Department of Energy (successor to the Manhattan Project’s organization), operate as “oligarchies” [00:59:47]. This means decisions are made by a few, often based on internal procedural outcomes and self-serving interests rather than direct results [00:33:17]. Scientists expect autonomy, making direct orders “demeaning” and leading to a focus on grant-writing that repackages existing research to fit funding criteria [00:57:56].
The U.S. government in the 1930s under FDR operated more like a “de facto monarchy,” enabling decisive action and the creation/destruction of agencies to achieve goals, which is absent in the present “proceduralized” Washington D.C. [01:01:36]. This shift in underlying constitutional character, despite the unchanged written constitution, explains the profound difference in state capacity [01:04:41].