From: jameskerlindsay
In May 2022, a significant development occurred in the former Soviet Union that went largely unnoticed amidst the war in Ukraine: the leader of the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia announced plans for a referendum on joining Russia [00:00:08]. Despite seeming like an opportune moment for Russia to annex the territory, the vote was swiftly called off due to Russian pressure [00:00:16]. This event highlighted the complex question of what Russia truly desires from South Ossetia [00:00:25].
De Facto States in International Relations
De facto states are a compelling aspect of contemporary international relations [00:00:41]. These entities have separated from a parent country and achieved a degree of independence, yet they remain largely, if not entirely, unrecognized by the broader international community [00:00:46]. They typically face political and economic isolation and often live under the threat of invasion from the state they left [00:00:56]. Consequently, they almost invariably depend on a “patron state” for diplomatic, financial, and military support [00:01:01].
The relationship between a de facto state and its patron can be highly intricate, as their goals are not always aligned [00:01:13]. Tensions can arise if the de facto state seeks either more distance or a closer relationship, potentially even full integration, with its patron [00:01:28].
South Ossetia: Geography and Demographics
South Ossetia is located in the north-central part of Georgia [00:02:59]. Georgia itself is situated in the Caucasus region, bordered by Russia to the north, Azerbaijan to the east, Armenia and Turkey to the south, and has a Black Sea coastline to the west [00:02:09]. Georgia is the 119th largest UN member state, covering 70,000 square kilometers (30,000 square miles) [00:02:21].
South Ossetia spans 3,900 square kilometers (1,500 square miles), making up about 5.5% of Georgia’s total territory [00:03:02]. While official figures suggest a population of around 50,000, most observers estimate it to be between 35,000 and 40,000 [00:03:11].
The ethnic Ossetians are a predominantly Christian Orthodox people whose ancestral roots trace back to the ancient Iranian Alans [00:03:19]. In parts of Georgia under government control, ethnic Georgians constitute 87% of the 3.7 million population, followed by Azerbaijanis (6%), Armenians (4.5%), and Russians (under 1%) [00:02:29].
Historical Context of South Ossetia’s Political Status
South Ossetia’s history of independence movements began in the late 18th century as Imperial Russia expanded into the Caucasus [00:03:26]. By the early 19th century, Russian forces had taken control of southern Caucasus, including the rest of Georgia [00:03:37].
The 1917 Russian Revolution separated the northern part of Ossetia (remaining with Russia) from the south, which became part of a brief independent Georgian state [00:03:45]. This division sparked a series of South Ossetian uprisings, which were brutally suppressed [00:03:57].
In 1921, the Soviet Red Army captured Georgia [00:04:03]. Although South Ossetians hoped for reunification with North Ossetia, the region was granted self-rule as the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast within the new Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [00:04:08]. This arrangement persisted for seven decades [00:04:22].
The Breakaway from Georgia
As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in the late 1980s, South Ossetia sought to break away [00:04:24]. In 1989, amidst rising tensions with the Georgian leadership, the South Ossetian Supreme Soviet voted to unite with North Ossetia [00:04:32]. The following year, South Ossetia declared itself a separate Soviet republic and appealed for Moscow’s recognition [00:04:40]. In response, the Georgian authorities revoked its autonomy and declared a state of emergency [00:04:51].
When Georgia regained its independence in 1991, it attempted to retake South Ossetia by force [00:04:58]. Despite initial gains, Georgia could not fully control the region [00:05:07]. With fighting escalating in Abkhazia, which was also seeking independence, the Georgian government accepted a ceasefire [00:05:11]. A joint peacekeeping force, including Russia, was established, paving the way for peace talks under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) [00:05:19].
Renewed Tensions (2003-2008)
For a decade, the situation remained relatively peaceful, with significant contact between South Ossetia and Georgia [00:05:30]. However, this changed in 2003 with the overthrow of the Georgian government and the rise of pro-Western president Mikhail Saakashvili [00:05:39]. Saakashvili’s promise to reassert control over breakaway regions led to renewed fighting [00:05:49]. Despite Georgia’s offer of maximum autonomy, South Ossetian leaders held an independence referendum, which showed overwhelming support for statehood [00:05:55].
Tensions escalated over the next few years, fueled by increasing hostility between Russia and the West [00:06:08]. In April 2008, NATO formally welcomed Georgia’s aspiration for membership, a decision condemned by Moscow as a “huge strategic mistake” [00:06:17].
The 2008 Russo-Georgian War
This culminated on August 7, 2008, when Russia and Georgia went to war [00:06:27]. Georgia ordered its forces into South Ossetia, claiming an attack on its troops [00:06:37]. Within hours, Russian soldiers and heavy armor flooded through the Roki Tunnel, linking North and South Ossetia [00:06:44]. After a five-day Russian onslaught by land, sea, and air, Georgia was forced to capitulate [00:06:52].
Under the ceasefire, Russian troops withdrew from most of Georgia, but South Ossetia and Abkhazia (approximately 20% of Georgia’s territory) remained under Russia’s effective control [00:07:00]. Two weeks later, Moscow recognized the two territories as independent sovereign states [00:07:14]. While most of the world rejected South Ossetia’s independence, four other countries (Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru, and Syria) eventually recognized it [00:07:22].
South Ossetia’s Desire for Unification with Russia
Despite its declared independence, most observers believe South Ossetia had little genuine interest in statehood [00:07:34]. Opinion polls indicated overwhelming support for unification with the much larger and more populous North Ossetia, within the Russian Federation [00:07:40]. Calls for a referendum on integration grew [00:07:53].
However, Russia steadfastly resisted calls for annexation, preferring “creeping de facto integration” over actual unification, even after annexing Crimea in 2014 [00:08:07]. For example, a 2015 treaty of alliance and integration saw Russia guarantee South Ossetia’s defense and security and establish a customs union, but it was explicitly framed in terms of interstate relations [00:08:23].
The 2022 Referendum Attempt and Cancellation
Despite Russia’s apparent opposition, unification remains a firm objective for South Ossetia [00:08:40]. This was evident in Spring 2022, when South Ossetian leader Anatoly Bibilov announced plans for a referendum on union with Russia [00:08:48]. Few took the idea seriously at the time, viewing it as an attempt by Bibilov to shore up support during a tough re-election campaign [00:09:02]. Although Bibilov was defeated, he still announced the poll would proceed on July 17 [00:09:12].
The planned vote drew condemnation from Georgia, the European Union, and the United States [00:09:22]. More interestingly, Russia also announced its opposition [00:09:28]. Russian Government Spokesman Dmitry Peskov suggested the Kremlin had not even been consulted and expressed serious concerns about the legal implications [00:09:34]. Moscow made it clear it had no intention of annexation at that stage, though it didn’t dismiss eventual unification [00:09:51].
On May 31, the new South Ossetian leader, Alan Gagloyev, issued a decree canceling the vote [00:10:00]. The decree cited legal uncertainties in the referendum wording and emphasized that South Ossetia could not make unilateral decisions affecting Russia’s interests, leaving little doubt that Moscow had intervened to stop the referendum [00:10:08].
Why Russia Resisted Annexation
The decision to cancel the referendum might seem strange, given the strong support for unification with Russia among South Ossetians [00:10:30]. South Ossetia, being small and isolated, has always shown a weak commitment to independent statehood, preferring unification with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation [00:10:41]. After decades of gradual integration, South Ossetia is already effectively part of the Federation, making formal annexation appear to be the logical next step [00:10:59]. The timing, amid the war in Ukraine, also seemed ideal, as extensive sanctions had already been imposed, suggesting Russia had little more to lose economically or diplomatically [00:11:12]. Annexation could have even been politically useful, sending a message to the West and paving the way for expected annexations in eastern Ukraine [00:11:32].
However, Russia’s reasons for resisting annexation are more complex [00:12:07]:
- Lack of Domestic Benefit: Unlike Crimea or the Donbas, Russians do not have the same emotional link with Ossetia, so annexation would not offer significant domestic political advantages for the Kremlin [00:12:15].
- International Costs: Annexing South Ossetia would incur further reputational damage for seizing territory from another sovereign state [00:12:36].
- Bargaining Chip: South Ossetia remains a useful bargaining chip with neighboring Georgia, which has increasingly aligned with the West [00:12:45].
- Constitutional Constraints: While international recognition for annexation is unlikely, practically, Russia would find it very difficult to allow South Ossetia’s eventual reintegration into Georgia, as the Russian constitution prohibits giving up annexed territory [00:12:54].
Therefore, for Moscow, gradual integration short of actual annexation represents a better long-term option [00:13:10].
Despite these explanations, some aspects remain puzzling [00:13:18]. The idea that Moscow might eventually hand South Ossetia back to Georgia, defying a deep-rooted Ossetian wish for unification and severing established ties, seems implausible [00:13:25]. This suggests that there is more to the situation than what appears on the surface, and even long-standing regional observers are divided on the exact dynamics at play [00:13:50]. The complex relationship between de facto states and their patrons often masks a situation that is extremely difficult for outsiders to decode [00:14:06].